When we understand the ontological, political and legal underpinnings associated with the concept of freedom, liberty and rights, we understand the relationship between rights and laws. Rights can be understood as liberties or as laws. Liberties can be understood as de facto rights or as de jure rights. It is de jure rights that are recognized as laws that provide the basis for the rule of law. It is the rule of law that provides the basis for equal rights and (...) equal justice in an ideal republic. Rights, laws and the rule of law are distinct. Rights are self-evident truths. Laws are imperatives backed by sanctions (John Austin). The rule of law is a principle that purports that the recognition de facto and de jure rights provide the basis for political, social and economic justice. People live by the rights recognized by law. As such, the rule of law advocates two fundamental underpinnings in a republic: (1) the recognition of rights as the basis for equal rights and equal justice, and (2) the recognition of law as the basis for governance. (H.L.A. Hart). However, since the recognition of law is the recognition of rights, the recognition of rights precedes the governance by law principle. What is fundamental to the rule of law is that it recognizes rights, legitimizes political rule and administers equal/blind justice (Meyers, 1213). As such, no branch of government can weaponize laws to terminate recognized individual rights. The maxim of the republic should be – while anyone can be the ruler, everyone lives as free as the ruler. Majority rule and protection of self-evident individual rights is fundamental to an ideal republic. Keywords: law, equal rights, equal justice, impunity, rule of law. (shrink)

Doxastic distinctions help us define the basis and biases in belief–formation. Empirical and extra-empirical justification play an important role in determining doxastic distinctions. When we distinguish the different types of beliefs, we understand that there are basically three kinds of beliefs, namely, verifiable, falsifiable, and unfalsifiable beliefs. Empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of verifiable and falsifiable beliefs. Extra-empirical justification provides the basis for establishing the veracity of unfalsifiable or irrefutable beliefs. Verifiable or falsifiable beliefs that are (...) reductive require the mandatory acceptance of their truth. However, unfalsifiable beliefs which are non-reductive require the volitional acceptance of their truth. Because there is both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation, we can accept beliefs with or without, against, or regardless of empirical evidence. Unfalsifiable beliefs do not mean that these beliefs are unjustifiable; it simply means that these beliefs are not empirically justifiable. Understanding the basis and biases of belief-formation is to be aware of how we come to know what we believe. As empirical basis allows us to hold beliefs based on either the principle of confirmation or falsification. Extra-empirical basis, namely phenomenological conjectures, allows us to hold beliefs founded on existential assertions. The intent of this paper is to present doxastic distinctions to help us understand the basis and biases associated with belief-formation. As long as epistemic claims are accepted, and their content is considered believable, the means used to arrive at those beliefs must also be respected. Every doxastic distinction not only provides the basis for belief-formation but also defines the role and limits of both empirical and extra-empirical justification in belief-formation. When we recognize the different types and different ways of justifying beliefs: we understand why we can accept beliefs with or without evidence; against or regardless of empirical justification, and know when to define beliefs as Plato argued as justified true belief and when to define beliefs as justified belief-decisions. Keywords: beliefs, justified true belief; justified belief-decisions, empirical and extra-empirical. (shrink)

Metaphysics deals with the intelligible world of questions and the explicable world of intentionality. Metaphysics is explicable, and its explicability is connected to questions related to what there is to know about the nature of reality. While physics deals with what is and what else there is, metaphysics deals with the nature of reality and what else there is to know about the nature of reality. If the content of metaphysics is considered as "answers" to questions related to cosmology and (...) consciousness, then metaphysical claims must be understood in the context of the questions that necessitate such claims. For without understanding the relevance of the questions, we cannot establish the 'truth' or 'falsity' of metaphysical claims. The relevance of the questions is the basis for establishing the veracity of the metaphysical distinctions. Hence, all metaphysical distinctions are a non-reductive explanation of what is considered as being reductive. The content of consciousness or intentionality deals with the following metaphysical distinctions, namely, the matter/mind, the essence/ existence, the space/time, the concrete/abstract, the particular/universal, and the contingent/necessary distinctions. These distinctions are made possible because of the questions raised by the intelligent mind. Two questions that connect physics and metaphysics are-- what is there and the nature of what is there. Two further questions that promote our interest in physics and metaphysics are: what else is there to know, and what else is there to know about the nature of reality. Reality and the nature of reality are the same. However, because the mind makes this distinction, we can state that what is physical is an empirical given, and what is metaphysical is a phenomenological or an existential given. Keywords: metaphysics, intentionality, subjectivity, creativity, freedom and time. (shrink)

This monograph examines the meaning of religion.