Traditional Chinese commentators rightly see that understanding Zhuangzi's way with words is the presupposition for understanding Zhuangzi at all. They are not sure, however, if Zhuangzi's words are super-effective or pure nonsense. I consider Zhuangzi's experience with language, and then turn to Heidegger's word of being to see if it may throw light on Zhuangzi's way of saying. I argue that a conversation between Heidegger and Zhuangzi on language is possible, but only by expanding Heidegger's notion of Gestell (enframing) and (...) through a destruction of the dominant Confucian discourse that obscures Zhuangzi's way of saying. (shrink)

The chapter considers the relation between language and logic in early Daoism. It explains the Daoist experience of language, which is closely related to the Daoist experience of the Way (dao). It is shown how Daoist logic differs from the Confucian logic of correctness and the Mohist logic of naming. Even if Daoist discourse does not follow these more familiar forms of logic, it does not negate the law of non-contradiction nor does it fall into the performative contradiction. Through readings (...) of significant Daoist stories the Daoist logic beyond logic is brought to view. (shrink)

In this chapter, Zahra Meghani provides a brief overview of the regulatory framework for consumer products in the United States, the European Union and Japan, followed by an extended analysis of their regulation of genetically modified food. The regulatory regimes for GM food of the three regions differ substantially, but they are committed to the same model of scientific risk assessment. That paradigm assumes that risk evaluations are not influenced by any normative concerns. This chapter critiques that conception of risk (...) assessment. It is argued that in the interest of presenting to the public an accurate account of their work, the regulatory entities of the US, the EU, and Japan should acknowledge that their risk assessment of GM food involve normative choices. Moreover, they should create open, transparent, democratic processes to include the public in the deliberations and decision-making about the values that should shape the risk evaluation of GM foods at every stage of the risk assessment process. (shrink)

Is the practice of UK patients traveling to India as medical tourists morally justified? This article addresses that question by examining three ethically relevant issues. First, the key factor motivating citizens of the United Kingdom to seek medical treatment in India is identified and analyzed. Second, the life prospects of the majority of the citizens of the two nations are compared to determine whether the United Kingdom is morally warranted in relying on India to meet the medical needs of its (...) citizens. Third, as neoliberal reforms are justified on the grounds that they will help the indigent populations affected by them, the impact of medical tourism-a neoliberal initiative-on India's socially and economically marginalized groups is scrutinized. © 2013, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc. (shrink)

Using eelgrass restoration in the Narragansett Bay as the touchstone for discussion, this chapter clarifies some of the challenges faced in ecological restoration by analyzing those challenges under three distinct philosophical classifications: epistemological, axiological, and normative. Examining wide divergences among governmental, scientific, and popular articulations of estuarine matters, the chapter surveys how the fractured relationships governing reflection, value, and action has been addressed both within and beyond various principles governing restoration. It also recounts the efforts of the Rhode Island advocacy (...) group Save the Bay to implement a community restoration initiative for children and then to redesign the initiative when original expectations about its effect did not come to fruition. Finally, the chapter addresses broader ambiguities about the relationships between fact and value, and between value and action, as they emerge from the restoration issues discussed. While the chapter avoids the prescription of particular solutions to the challenges facing eelgrass and other estuarine restoration, it strives to delineate and illuminate the tangled sources of value that can drive everyday decisions—sources that, left unexamined, may contribute collectively to the demise of eelgrass populations. (shrink)

For the purposes of conservation or suppression of species, gene drive technology has significant potential. Theoretically speaking, with the release of even relatively few animals with gene drive systems in an ecosystem, beneficial or harmful genes could be introduced into the entire wild-type population of that species. Given the profound impact that gene drives could have on species and ecosystems, their use is a highly contentious issue. Communities and groups have differing beliefs about nature and its conservation or preservation, as (...) well as concerns about the ecological safety of the eradication, replacement or enhancement of particular species of animals by means of genetic engineering. For all those reasons, the rigorous regulation of insects and other animals with gene drive systems is crucial. In this paper, we consider the question of whether the United States Food and Drug Administration is prepared to effectively regulate insects and other animals with gene drives. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study was to develop and evaluate a model of the late adolescent individuation process. The model developed and subsequently tested incorporated familial, environmental and behavioral variables. Specifically, the family system's level of differentiation, the degree of triangulation between the late adolescent and his or her parents, and the late adolescent's year in college were examined as predictor variables in relation to the late adolescent's degree of individuation, degree of psychological distress, and achievement of relationship intimacy. (...) In addition, the relationships between several specific family processes and the achievement of individuation were explored. Subjects consisted of two hundred and sixty-two university undergraduates who received course credit for the completion of a variety of self-report assessment instruments. The family system's level of differentiation emerged as a significant predictor of late adolescent individuation. A high degree of family communication and a low degree of family conflicts also demonstrated a relationship with individuation. More individuated late adolescents reported less psychological distress and more intimate extrafamilial attachments. Triangulation of the late adolescent into the parental relationship was not predictive of individuation but was predictive of relationship intimacy. A developmental, multigenerational perspective on the individuation process is outlined and recommendations are made for the treatment of psychological distress among late adolescents in accordance with this broad based approach. (shrink)

In De Trinitate Augustine of Hippo gave his most complete analysis of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The most crucial part of his logical analysis, Books V-VIII, shows Augustine attempting to handle the seeming logical dilemma of one God, yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. At the outset of his investigation, Augustine apparently had two concepts in mind. First, he accepted the Bible as authoritative; and obviously he accepted the idea that this authoritative Bible taught that Go was one, (...) and yet also three in some way. Also, Augustine worked from the contemporary understanding of Aristotle’s categories in attempting his language analysis to decipher what could and should be said of the Godhead. Augustine tried to remove terminological confusion which obscured the discussion of the Trinity in the late fourth century, and he also attempted to strip from the terms used of the Godhead the things which could not be said of God. Basically, he affirmed that God is one, yet three, and that God is immutable. In his estimation, for God to be God there could be no change in the Godhead. Three primary words were us ed to describe this Godhead: substance, person and relation. But, if these terms entailed the idea of mutability, they were inaccurate and could not apply to the Godhead. But language must be used if anything is to be conveyed about God. Therefore, because Augustine accepted the thesis, on Biblical authority, that God is one God, yet Father, Son and Spirit, he had to strip from the terms that which entailed mutability. His result might be called spiritual substance, persons, and relations. The view of reality projected by the Bible was, for Augustine, the true projection, and the scientifically demonstrable was not all of reality. He made no pretense of giving a proof of the Trinity; rather, he acknowledged the precedence of faith over knowledge, and tried to make more credible that which faith affirmed. The real point of criticism, then, is one’s frame of reference. Either there is a spiritual world, or there is not. If it exists, perhaps language must be adjusted to describe it. Certainly reality is not known independently of language; yet language may distort the view of reality by inaccurately protraying it. Augustine redefined his language to portray that which he accepted as reality. Words, for him, were functional, and not determinative. Although human language can hardly describe the spiritual world which is immutable, only by using this language with carefully guarded definitions can the spiritual world be discussed. Therefore, if one expects De Trinitate to be a testable proof of the Trinity, it fails miserably. However, if one grants the possibility of a triune God, Augustine's work is most helpful in coming to a better understanding of the nature of that God. (shrink)

The three main non-traditional schools of environmental philosophy - social ecology, feminism and deep ecology - contain divergent views of and claims regarding the universalization of their particular world views. One example of this divergence of views concerns the status of human/non-human relationships. Like many other contemporary non-traditional liberation movements and theories, these three environmental movements and schools of thought have been influenced by the theories of Karl Marx. Therefore, in order to clarify and understand the way in which, and (...) the extent to which, key proponents of each of these environmental movements and philosophies universalize their particular philosophic world views, this thesis compares their theories to those of Karl Marx. Emphasis is placed on Marx's critique of abstract and idealist-based universalizing as applied in the area of human-non-human relationships, as this critique and area of application is a key feature of non-traditional environmental thought. Also, the methodology used in this thesis is a critical analysis of the primary philosophic texts and related commentaries. (shrink)

The argument from design is one of the most widely debated arguments for the existence of God. There has been much written in support of and in criticism of the argument's basic structure and conclusion. I shall attempt to clarify these positions, and to argue that the theistic account provides a more rationally justified explanation of human life on earth than the atheistic account. Many philosophers think that any proof for the existence of God is mere "metaphysical speculation." Many times (...) these philosophers use the criteria of scientific empiricism as the standard for an "acceptable" scientific theory, regardless of the subject matter. I shall formulate the argument from design as an empirical scientific theory according to the school of scientific falsificationism as stated by Karl Popper. The principal literature to be investigated in this study will be the most recent articles and texts which discuss relevant scientific data, and their philosophical implications for the argument from design. The results of this investigation demonstrate that it is possible to formulate an argument for the existence of God which meets all of the criteria of the falsificationists school of scientific empiricism. (shrink)

Historically emotions have been excluded from the moral sphere. However, in this century there have been at least two theories which do recognize a relationship between ethics and the emotions, namely, A. J. Ayer's emotivism and Dietrich von Hildebrand's theory of affective morality. Emotivism is a theory which claims that when one makes an ethical judgment, such as "murder is wrong," one is not saying anything about murder but merely evincing the emotions one has with respect to murder. It is (...) as if one said "murder" in a particularly harsh tone of voice and nothing more. In contrast, von Hildebrand's theory claims that not only is murder truly wrong but when one hears of a murder one should respond with the appropriate emotional response, such as sorrow or righteous anger. Because of its adoption of the empirical verifiability criterion, Ayer's theory holds that all value statements are cognitively meaningless and all value judgments, including those of morality, are nothing but expressions of emotions. This theory removes ethics from meaningful philosophical discourse and deems it to be a subject only for the social sciences. This theory can be found faulty on many accounts. Not only can it be shown that by the existence of purely ethical arguments Ayer's theory is refuted but also it can be shown that this theory is self-annihilating. On the other hand, von Hildebrand's theory offers a clear analysis of the affective sphere and its moral pertinence. Von Hildebrand's explanation of the "heart" as denoting the affective sphere elucidates the distinction between the affective response and the other entities with which it may easily be confused. Due to its intentional nature, the affective response may be morally correct or morally incorrect. It is the morally conscious person who uses his cooperative freedom to sanction an appropriate affective response and/or to disavow an inappropriate affective response. Thus it is shown that emotions do fall within the realm of ethics and a meaningful relationship can be established between ethics and emotions. (shrink)

In this t he sis four secular approaches to ethics which purport to either establish or lay the theoretical foundation for establishing objective ethical norms come in for a critical examination: These are: 1) the naturalism of Richard Taylor, 2) the linguistic conventionalism of John R. Searle, 3) the existentialist choice of Jean-Paul Sartre, and 4) the openly "ontological" strategy of Henry Veatch. Each of the above theories seeks to establish, explicitly or implicitly, a normative ethical requirement to respect the (...) rights, freedom, etc. of other human beings. Using a consistent individualistic egoism as a foil, it is argued that each of the four theories considered fails, on the basis of its own initial assumptions concerning "goodness," "rightness," "obligation," the ontological status of man, etc., to turn back the challenge posed by the egoist. Each of the four theories is viewed as an unsuccessful attempt to derive a normative ethical "ought" from a factual, descriptive ''is." In the final section of the thesis the four secular ethical theories are contrasted with atheistically based theory of ethics, and it is argued that the latter has · a distinct advantage over the former with regard to the establishment of objective ethical norms. Finally, epistemological problems associated with the establishment of the foundational assumptions of all the theories are briefly commented on. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with the problem of entailment. Entailment is a form of implication, perhaps the strongest found in logical calculi. The development of entailment logics is rather new in the history of logic. The entailment concept has however, been employed for the designation of a strong implication relation between antecedent and consequent. It has been used by some to designate deducibility. There are, however, alternative systems of implication which have been fanned and equated by some to the concept (...) of entailment. A central question then, is what conditions shall be given to an acceptable statement of entailment, and how does entailment differ from alternative implication systems? The properties which are inherent in logical implication are shown by a historical sketch in this thesis. The first form of implication discussed is ‘material implication.’ Material implication as found in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica is discussed. Following upon this the evolution of strict implication and the ‘S’ systems of C.I. Lewis and E.H. Langford are analyzed. In the context of these discussions both the common and diverse properties are discussed. It is found that both material and strict implication have internal weakness in so far as both produce implicational paradoxes. The question then becomes, can an entailment logic overcome these difficulties, or rather must an entailment logic avoid their paradoxes peculiar to the systems cited? With the development of system E by Alan Anderson and Noel Belnap, we find a paradox-free system of implication. The system is designated ‘E’ for entailment by the authors. The system E is formed by combining the semantical character “relevance” with that of necessity. It is shown that the system E does not contain the paradoxical theorems nor any analogues of the theorems which give the paradoxes. In the context of this discussion a proper focus is given for several logical terms used in describing the relations between antecedent and consequent. The research of this thesis deals with certain definite problems. Is strict implication the same as entailment? According to the research of thesis this identification is doubtful. Of further concern is whether or rather what logically follows from contradiction. This research rejects the claims that anything whatsoever “follows from” a contradiction. A final concern of this research is the relation of entailment in modal semantics. This problem which is more general is concerned with such developments as modal models on the one hand and the nature of possibility on the other. It is found that an impossible proposition need not have the essential form of a contradiction. (shrink)

This thesis attempts an explanation of the object of signs in Charles s. Peirce's semiotic theory. In this regard it tries to defend Peirce's view that every sign has an object. The question of the conventionality of signs is also taken up in the investigation of Peirce's classification of signs. In this regard the thesis attempts to argue, contrary to Peirce, that anything requires a convention if it is to be significative. In chapter I Peirce's categories are introduced and explained (...) in order to provide the necessary background for the later explanation of his classificatory scheme. In chapter II Peirce's original three classification trichotomies are discussed in order to develop the main lines of the triadic sign relation and Peirce's sign theory in general. In this chapter it is argued that Peirce’s classification scheme breaks down at certain points and leads to a blurring of some of the distinctions between signs. On this point the question of conventions in sign theory arises. The thesis argues that a convention is required for all signs whereas Peirce seems to think that only symbols require a convention. An explanation of the immediate-dynamical object distinction and the immediate-dynamical-final interpretant distinction is also attempted in this chapter. In chapter II the question of the object of signs is taken up in some detail. Here it is argued that every sign has an object when it is actually functioning as a sign. In this regard much emphasis is put on the role of context in determining the object of a given sign. The distinction between the immediate and dynamical object is developed in greater detail and it is suggested that this distinction might be helpful in deciding whether or not Peirce thought all things are signs. In the conclusion a summary of the arguments for the necessity of a convention for all signs and the intentionality of all signs is given and some other questions in sign theory are suggested. A bibliography is appended to the end of the thesis. (shrink)

This thesis deals with the problem of becoming a self as it is presented in the philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Specifically it is concerned with the role which power plays in the development of the self. Since becoming a self involves motivation the problem is viewed in terms of Dietrich Von Hildebrand's categories of importance and their role in motivation. The categories importance are presented as the basic viewpoint from which the two philosophers are studied. This is (...) followed by a presentation of basic notions of the self as they appear in the writing of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Within this background the specific question of the role of power is investigated, first generally and then specifically as it applies to each philosopher. Next the self is viewed in terms of J immanence and. transcendence. Finally, with these concepts in mind, each philosopher's notion of the self is analyzed in depth. After studying these two philosophers and their ideas on the role of power in becoming a self several things become clear. Although both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are called the forerunners of existentialism there is a great deal of difference between the two in their respective philosophies of man. Nietzsche claims to be against the development of a "type" of man and ·is regarded as a proponent of individuality. Yet will to power as an immanent drive lead s one to the impersonality of fatalism. Therefore there is no true individuality, nor true self in Nietzsche's philosophy because he denies that relationship to another is essential to the self. Kierkegaard, who states that the proper relationship to God is absolutely necessary if one is to become a self, emerges as the true advocate of individuality. This is not the totally independent individuality which is often associated with existentialism but rather individuality which comes from being grounded in a greater Power. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation of the question of the probative force of the syllogism. It examines on what the probative force of propositions constituting an argument depends and some of the cases in which the conclusion of a syllogism is and is not proven by the premises. The investigation begins by looking at certain preliminary notions associated with arguments in general and categorical syllogisms in particular. In each categorical syllogism are found two claims. One is the claim to truth (...) made by each proposition, and another is the claim to validity made by the syllogism. When each of these claims are fulfilled the syllogism is then sound. The question is whether or not every sound syllogism also represents a proof of the conclusion. John Stuart Mill asserted that no deductive argument including the syllogism can be a proof of the truth of the conclusion on the grounds that the premises presuppose the conclusion. In fact each syllogism is an example of the fallacy of petitio principii which it must by its very nature commit. Alexander Pfänder instead claimed that only in certain cases is the conclusion not proven by the premises, while in other cases the truth of the conclusion is actually proven by the truth of the premises. An independent investigation of the question of the probative force of the syllogism is made. Because of a crucial difference between propositions affirming contingent states of fact and essentially necessary propositions affirming necessary states of fact, it is shown that no syllogism containing contingent propositions can be a proof, while a proof is present in the case of a syllogism containing essentially necessary propositions. When the propositions of an argument are contingent their truth follows from the fact each particular existing instance they refer to actually has what is affirmed by the proposition. Therefore, if the syllogism is valid, the conclusion will refer to at least some of the same particular existing instances on which the truth of each of the premises depends. The premises can be true only if the conclusion is true, and any uncertainty about the truth of the conclusion extends also to the premises. The premises cannot prove the truth of the conclusion since their truth presupposes the truth of the conclusion. Propositions which are essentially necessary are true regardless of whether or not any particular instance exists or will ever exist. Because the state of fact is essentially necessary, the predicate is intelligibly grounded necessarily in the subject. If these kinds of propositions are found in a syllogism, their truth will not depend on the truth of a conclusion. Essentially necessary propositions have probative force, and their presence in a valid argument results in an actual proof of the conclusion. (shrink)

A discriminant analysis, analysis of maximum separation, and analysis of percentage of contribution of sixty-four case referred firesetters and sixty-four equated, case referred nonfiresetters to Mental Hygiene Services and Child Welfare Services, Department of Social Welfare, State of Rhode Island, partially confirmed the hypothesis that firesetters can be differentiated from nonfiresetters by the psychological characteristics of impulsiveness, hyperactivity, enuresis, hostility, theft, destructiveness, hyperkinesis, and abnormal sexual practices at different chronological, developmental stages of growth. Only a combination, disregarding individual analysis, of (...) age groups five through seven, eight through eleven, and twelve through sixteen in toto, yielded significant results. This suggested that firesetters and nonfiresetters develop, both physically and emotionally, in accord with Freudian psychosexual, developmental stages. The hypothesis that firesetters remain fixated on an oral psychosexual level of development was therefore rejected as was the suggestion that they are fixated on a more advanced phallic-urethral psychosexual level. The behavioral characteristic, impulsiveness, was found to be the only symptom in the total group which contributed heavily to the maximum separation of firesetters and nonfiresetters; the other symptoms contributed less than 10 percent individually. The categorical question, “what is a firesetter?” was concluded to be a meaningless query in regards to the clinical application of differentiating firesetters and nonfiresetters and formulating viable theoretical hypotheses concerning the psychodynamic interpretation of the act of firesetting. Psychodynamic postulations concerning the act of firesetting remain on a idiographic level because of methodological problems, of which some are inherent, in research for “applied” fields. The literature was critically reviewed in order to provide an explanation for previous contradictory findings and to propose guidelines for future research in this area. (shrink)

The question as to whether empirical knowledge has any foundations and, if it does, just what those foundations might be, has long been an important epistemological question. The problem with which I am concerned is that of taking primitive sensory experience as the ground of empirical knowledge. I consider three attempts on the part of 20th century British and American analytical philosophers to substantiate our ordinary knowledge claims about an extra-mental, empirical reality. The first of these is the sense-datum approach (...) to the problem, in which by using the act-object analysis of simple sensations, the independent status of things sensed was thought to be established. But I point out that the sense-datum theorists do not prove the point they set out to prove, but only succeed in illuminati: 1g the fundamental assumptions of Realism in opposition to those of Idealism. In opposition to the sense-datum Realists, I advance the adverbial analysis of sensation, and in so doing open the way to a less direct but more credible Realism. The second part considers the protocol-statement theories, according to which empirical knowledge is a truth-functional syntactical system of propositions ultimately grounded on a class of atomic propositions: the protocol statements. It becomes apparent that the protocol-statement theories must choose between subjectivism and corrigibility. The relation of empirical knowledge claims to subjective sense experiences is problematic. Finally, I relate the attempt made to rework the phenomenalistic and physicalistic epistemic systems of the Logical Positivists along the lines of warranting relations rather than implicative relations. Thus sensory experience comes to have an evidence-conferring relation to empirical knowledge claims. But that relation is a complex one which must be determined in the light of all our relevant information; particularly that regarding the causal conditions prevailing in our perceptual environment. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with answering the following question: What is phenomenological realism? I have tried to accomplish this, in part, by looking at the history of phenomenological realism. However, it is not sufficient to look at the history of this movement if we are to understand what it is today. Thus, I have tried to present the reader with the attitude, methods, and the ontological and epistemological foundations of phenomenological realism, both in some of their early formulations and in (...) their later, more refined forms. While many phenomenological realists differ with regards to certain issues, I think that there exists much agreement concerning these basic aspects of the philosophy. I have tried to present these foundational aspects of phenomenological realism using the following outline. Chapter one concerns itself with phenomenological realism as a twentieth century philosophy. I mention the leading figures of this movement, both in the Munich and Goettingen Circles, and I use the works of Adolf Reinach and Dietrich von Hildebrand in order to demonstrate the attitude which is at the heart of this philosophy. I then proceed, in chapter two, to present the ways in which Plato's writings implicitly contain many of the notions which are vital to phenomenological realism. In chapter three I argue that the term ‘phenomenological realism’ does not accurately describe this philosophy and suggest that the term which Fritz Wenisch has proposed, ‘chreontic philosophy,’ more accurately describes this movement. I then present three examples of how the attitude and methods of chreontic philosophy have been used to uncover certain features of reality. Finally, I conclude with responses to three objections concerning insight and the existence of genuine essences. (shrink)

Stanislaw Lesniewski is called a nominalist, even though his published works contain no developed philosophical doctrine. Yet, in order to understand and interpret his logical systems, we must understand his nominalism. This thesis will investigate, in detail, the philosophical origins of the "nominalistic" elements of Lesniewski’s logical systems and will offer a characterization of his nominalism. This thesis will provide a brief historical sketch of Lesniewski 1s career as a logician and of the times in which his logical systems were (...) developed. A definition of nominalism will be developed within the context of the realist/nominalist debate over the existence of universals and a realists notion of universals will be given as a background against which Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs can be measured. The philosophical origins of Lesniewski's nominalism will be explored and will provide the basis for an examination of the nominalistic elements of his logical systems and the basis for a characterization of his nominalism. Lesniewski's nominalism avoids traditional classification and can only be examined indirectly through an analysis of his logical systems and through his attitude towards Russellian classes. In the final analysis, it is best to say that Lesniewski was a philosopher who created consistent logical systems in which to "talk" about objects. (shrink)

For much of his life, Saint Augustine was preoccupied with concerns related to the freedom of the In.mm will. If one traces his view of the human will throughout his life, one notices a significant development. In his early writings against the Manichaeans he maintained that the origin of evil can be traced to evil choice. At the very end of his life he came to defend the position that the human will did not have the ability to turn to (...) God apart from divine intervention. In this study I demonstrate that Augustine’s view of the freedom of the human will underwent a significant development during the first decade after his conversion to Christianity. To demonstrate this, I outline his position as it is found in his works during three periods within this decade. The first period, before his ordination, is the period in which he held that the human will has the freedom of indifference. In other words, it is possible for an individual to turn to God or to refuse to turn regardless of divine intervention. The second period, after his ordination and before his episcopacy, is the period in which, although still holding to the freedom of indifference, Augustine recognized to a much greater degree the struggle in the human will. The third period is his early years as bishop. During this time, Augustine held that it is impossible for an individual to turn to God without divine intervention and it is impossible to refuse to turn, if such intervention was granted. Finally, I briefly sketch three possible influences on this development. First, I show that it was Augustine’s study of the scriptures which was, probably, the principal influence. Next, I discuss how his own moral and spiritual struggle may have helped him realize the difficulty of making right moral choices. The third possible influence was his attempt at reforming the moral and spiritual lives of those in his congregation. These three factors may have helped Augustine recognize that it is only with the aid of divine intervention that an individual can turn to God. (shrink)

The problem which this thesis proposes to treat is Immanuel Kant’s attempt to frame an ethical system ultimately based on the postulate of moral freedom, and at the same time to espouse what he describes as the doctrine of “radical innate evil in human nature.” While the examination may well have significant implications for moral and religious theories beyond the boundaries of Kantian thought, generally these tempting vistas are not explored in the thesis. Indeed, the issue may also have broad (...) repercussions for Kant’s philosophy in general but this too lies beyond the scope of the thesis. The investigation is limited as much as possible to the presentation and analysis of Kant’s specific argument for moral autonomy and radical evil as it is found in his two major ethical works Critique of Practical Reason and The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, as well as his religious treatise, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. However, the major interpretations of Kant’s doctrines of moral autonomy and radical evil are examined in some detail since the definition of these terms is crucial for any examination of their compatibility. The first section of the thesis, “Moral Autonomy” consists of a presentation and analysis of some of the more prominent and differing interpretations of Kant’s notion of moral autonomy. Primarily, the section deals with the views of Hans Veihinger, W. T. Jones, John R. Silber, and Lewis White Beck. Both the “frasdom as fiction” interpretation of Vaihinger and the “freedom as personality fulfillment” interpretation of Jones are rejected as not accurately representing Kant’s own view of moral autonomy. The “freedom as spontaneity” interpretation of Silber is endorsed, but it is also suggested that a full understanding of moral autonomy requires the additional insights of Beck with respect to the distinction between “freedom as spontaneity” and “freedom as autonomy.” The interpretation of moral autonomy upon which the balance of the thesis is constructed is, therefore, a combination of the views of Silber and Beck. The second section of the thesis, “Radical Evil,” contains a systematic presentation of Kant’s doctrine of “radical innate evil in human nature.” There is much less controversy concerning the definition of this term than surrounds the definition of “moral autonomy.” This is probably due to the fact that the only place where Kant fully treats this doctrine is in the Religion and his discussion of it there is thorough and reasonably straightforward. The final section is an analysis of the compatibility of these two Kantian doctrines. First, it is argued that Kant was very well aware of the danger of contradicting his fundamental ethical postulate of moral autonomy in affirming the doctrine of radical evil. Second, due to his cognizance of this danger, he carefully and successfully defined radical evil in such a way that it does not contradict moral autonomy. Third, the compatibility of these two doctrines in Kant’s philosophy may not ultimately be a satisfactory resolution of the general problem of affirming that man is both morally responsible and morally depraved because Kant’s understanding of radical evil is dubious. (shrink)

The problem is to elucidate the nature of two types of commitments that involve an objective bond, the promise and the vow. The basis for the discussion is an article by Adolf Reinach, “The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law”. Promising and the promise are compared and contrasted with vowing and the vow. The method used is an attitude of openness to the data which present themselves. The essential characteristics of these entities are examined.

Heidegger's essay "The Origin of the Work of Art" contains difficult and often ambiguous concepts. This thesis attempts to clarify Heidegger's thoughts on works of art. The discussion begins with an examination of what Heidegger means by truth. The determination is that a thing's meaning in relation to our existence and what that meaning reveals about us constitutes Heideggerian truth. The disclosure of truth requires an encounter which allows things to direct us as to what they are. The possibility of (...) our being directed is dependent upon the establishing of certain conditions. Equipment, science, technology, and language are investigated to determine whether or not they are able to establish the conditions which are necessary for the disclosure of truth. The conclusion is that they are not because they fall victim to our directives when we encounter them. Works of art are those things which are able to establish the necessary conditions for a proper encounter with things. Since things other than works of art are subject to our directives, artworks have become the only things which are able to disclose truth. This claim finds support through analysis of Heidegger's works "The Origin of the Work of Art", "The Essence of Truth", and "The Question Concerning Technology" and through a critical examination of commentaries on those works. (shrink)

Kant's statement limiting the material of cognitive categories to the empirical--that which appears to us in the manifold of sensible intuition--is examined in its relation to the concept of a Thing presumed by definition to be nonempirical or transcendent of the empirical, the God of modern theism. Kant's limiting statement forbids the application of the a priori concepts of understanding, the categories of Existence, Causality, and determinate Necessity, in three proofs of the existence of a transcendent ens realissimum. Rather the (...) application of these categories is limited to natural states of affairs in the sections of Kant's Dialectic devoted to three traditional arguments for God's existence. In what follows the Kantian theory of existence is explored in close detail as is Kant's limitation of the meaning of causality and necessity. Each proof is given in the formulation Kant examined, with reference to the source of that formulation. A summary of Kant's treatment is then set forth and exposed to analysis. If Kant's negative criticism of the three proofs under examination depends on his limiting statement, then we are naturally led to inquire after the logical status of that statement and Kant's defense of it. While it is beyond our scope to set forth and expound the theoretical foundation of Kant's principle of cognitive limitation, it becomes clear through analysis that that principle fails to limit to sensibilia the application of the categories, since that principle is itself the knowledge-claim that the category Limitation applies to the abstract and nonempirical class of all conceptual acts of knowledge. That is, Kant's statement of limitation knows what it professes not to know, that the category Limitation has an application outside objects of possible experience. Thus, if Kant's limitative statement failed as a knowledge-claim in the manner indicated, it would appear that we need to seek elsewhere for a general epistemological principle for the criticism of theistic arguments. (shrink)

The epistemological problem that I shall investigate in this thesis is the separation of the knowing subject from the object that is known. Generally, this problem is called "the subject-object dichotomy." Traditionally only the mind bas been considered as the knower, while the body has been thought of merely as a passive vehicle of data. Thus one has been left with the mind separated from the body and from the objects of knowledge by the body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a contemporary French (...) phenomenologist, has sought to overcome the separation between the knower and the known by understanding the body as a crucial dimension of the active knower. The purpose of this present study is to examine whether and how Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body can be said to eliminate the subject-object dichotomy. In the first chapter, I explicate Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment, including his critique of traditional theories of perception, as well as his exploration of the importance of the body and the role of language to the act of knowing. In the second chapter, I trace the application of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to epistemology, giving special attention to our knowledge of the world, other persons, and ourselves. I conclude that the epistemic gap between the knower and the known can be overcome, along the lines proposed by Merleau-Ponty, by viewing the body at the outset as an intentional, active knower. (shrink)

Nietzsche on Truth and Overcoming traces the development of Friedrich Nietzsche's epistemic criticism. Nietzsche's outright denial of the existence of truth is grounded in his claim that stable metaphysical entities do not exist. The following inquiry examines Nietzsche's method of doubting which compels him to dismiss "being" as a fictitious "perspectival falsification". Nietzsche's denial of the reality of pre-existent "being" creates problems with communicating what he means through normal language. Nietzsche on Truth and Overcoming elucidates the problems which Nietzsche creates (...) through his uprooting of being and provides Nietzsche's hint as to where mankind might still look for the "most real", in art. Through his conception of the Dionysian artist, Nietzsche offers us the tragic annihilator of the "all-too-human" fictions of linguistic truth. This thesis thereby concludes that the Dionysian artist is Nietzsche's "answer" to epistemology, for the tragic wisdom of the Dionysian provides a glimpse into primal reality precisely because he affirms existence in spite of not knowing fiction as the logical opposite of truth. (shrink)

This thesis addresses the problem of the essence and mode of existence of the objects created by sentences found in literary works. In other words, it addresses the question, "Are there such things as fictional objects, and if so what kind of being do they possess?" It investigates whether the meanings of the words and sentences used to produce fictional objects, and these objects themselves, are real, ideal, purely psychic or have another distinct mode of existence; and if the latter, (...) it shows that these meanings or their objects have more objectivity than purely imagined objects. It addresses the question of what consequences there are in holding various positions on the ontology of word and sentence meanings that are used in the creation of fictional objects. It also analyzes the type of logical structure and nature fictional objects possess, making use of insights gained from Roman Ingarden. (shrink)

This study will investigate the foundations of Martin Buber’s authenticity. The problems of the foundation of authenticity arises in Jean-Paul Sartre who makes contradictory claims when he says on the one hand there are no objective ethical values while on the other says “we ought to be authentic.” The questions are: Can authenticity be separated from objective values and still impose an obligation? And what are the foundations for saying “we ought to be authentic”? In the first section Buber’s notion (...) of Wirklichkeit is examined and will be shown to provide some legitimate foundation for authenticity by implying an obligation in reference to what man “ought to be”. The second section reviews Buber’s acceptance of objective values and discusses how this acceptance provides Buber with another foundation of authenticity. Buber’s notion of Verantwortung is essential to understanding his views on objective ethical values and their ontological foundation in God. The third section points out how Buber’s philosophy overcomes the existential nothingness that confronts modern man. In the Conclusion the value and importance of Buber’s philosophy, as well as some of the problems connected with it, are discussed. (shrink)

The Third Man Argument, which made its first recorded appearance in the philosophy of ancient Greece, has most often been thought of as an attack upon Plato's Theory of Forms. Plato’s theory, of course, accommodated two types of ‘man’: the Form and the particular. The Form was that which two or more particular men were said to be like one another ‘in virtue of.’ Plato had sought to restore the notion of stability in a world of apparent flux. Forms were (...) unchanging, perfect, and independent. Particulars were changing, imperfect, and dependent upon the Forms for their being. The Third Man Argument attempts to show a flaw in Plato’s Theory of Forms. What is indeed strange is the fact that Plato presents the argument himself in his dialogue the Permenides and seemingly leaves it unanswered. This has led commentators to a host of interpretations, pronouncing the argument valid or invalid, finding its role in Plato’s development either significant or insignificant. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the various versions of the Third Man Argument, to examine commentaries on them, to judge the validity of the arguments and their significance to Plato’s philosophy. It is my finding that Plato was certainly aware of the argument he was presenting -- that he was actually using it to purge his followers of false notions of his theory arising, apparently, from taking his metaphorical language too literally. That he was aware of the difficulty of finding the right words, is seen, I think, in his dialogue Cratylus, It is my contention, however, that Plato knew the argument was valid and goes on in the Parmenides to set his followers straight -- presenting a dialectical exercise showing the necessity of certain combinations of Forms and indirectly implying that the Third Man Argument can be answered. Further it is possible that Plato had attempted to forestall a ‘third man’ as early as the Republic. And with more technical terminology of recent times, identifying Forms as ‘exemplary causes’ and particulars as ‘relational entities,’ I think that Plato's theory can be understood in such a way to hinder the entrance of any ‘third man.’ But the role that the Third Man Argument plays in Plato's philosophy is not so much a step in his development as it is a step to forestall others from developing his theory into something it was never intended to be. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. Specifically, the emphasis will be on what Marcel takes to be the unique epistemological demands of metaphysical subject matters. Metaphysics, once considered the "Queen of the Sciences" has for some time been challenged in its position as a legitimate and/or viable philosophical discipline. This attitude toward metaphysics has been expressed in the philosophical community as either active, direct attack or, more recently, passive neglect -- ‘ignore-ance’ -- which perhaps suggests that (...) the dominant feeling among members, the philosophical community may be that metaphysics simply no longer warrants any attention at all. Although the current position of disrepute into which metaphysics has fallen may be explained in many and various ways, two major contributing fac ·tors may be noted here: the stubborn resistence of traditional metaphysical questions to any complete and final answers; and the impressive success in recent history of the scientific method in the improvement of the human condition. It is certainly the case that metaphysics is a particularly puzzling and frustrating discipline. However, the rejection of metaphysics is not a thing to be taken lightly or without careful consideration of the repercussions and significance of the demise of that discipline which deals with the most fundamental, most significant, and most important questions human beings can ever pose: the very intelligibility of the universe; the nature of man, his ultimate origin and destiny; good and evil; God. It will not do to cut off access to such realms because of impatience of frustration with their magnitude and difficulty. Due to the importance of the subject matter of metaphysics, conscientious consideration of any and all alternatives to its demise must be undertaken. It is to this end that this thesis is presented. (shrink)

The ultimate aim of this essay is to explicate and justify Kant's transcendental deduction of the category of causality. To put the matter simply, it seeks to show that there are causal relations. This is successfully accomplished 1f it can be shown, granting _ the empirical reality of time as a necessary condition of experience, that the empirical. reality of causal relations is a necessary condition of the empirical. reality of time. This demonstration involves three steps. First, it is argued (...) that the empirical reality of something permanent is a necessary condition of the empirical reality of time.. This follows from the fact that the intuitive representation of time involves the idea of a unity which remains numerically identical despite the manifold of passing moments contained in it. It is then argued that the empirical reality of time involves the empirical. reality of a phenomenon which emood1es the property of numerical identity across time, and which, hence, is permanent. This is a fundamental contention of the "First Analogy.” Secondly, it is argued that the empirical. reality of matter is a necessary condition of the empirical reality of something permanent. This argument centers on the notion of a numerically identical object to which different appearances may be related. It is concluded that the possession of spatial relations is a necessary condition of the possession of numerical identity, and further, that being in space makes possible the distinction between the object and its representation. This contention is contained, in modified form, in the second edition "Refutation of Idealism." Thirdly, it is argued that the empirical reality of causal relations is a necessary condition of the empirical reality of matter. Taking matter to be that which is capable of alteration, the argument focuses upon the concept of objective succession. It is contended that the concept of objective succession involves the notion of a necessary, or, irreversible sequence of representations, that is, a sequence determined by the object. Significantly, the necessity of this notion does not follow by virtue of an analysis of the given concept of objective succession, but rather, stems from the need to add, in synthetic manner, a scheme, or, "supporting intuition," which will render the concept "serviceable" in experience. The argument for causality is presented in the "Second Analogy." By simple logical deduction, then, it is concluded that the empirical reality of causal relations is a necessary condition of the empirical reality of time. Given the fact of experience, and the empirical reality of time as its necessary condition, it follows necessarily that there are causal relations, which is what was to be proven. (shrink)

The central problem of this paper is to decide the significance of formal argument for God's existence, in light of John Henry Newman's distinction between notional and real assent. If God in fact exists, then only real assent to the proposition asserting his existence is adequate. Notional assent is inadequate because it is assent to a notion or abstraction, and not to a present reality. But on Newman's view it is notional assent which normally follows on a formal inference, therefore (...) the significance of traditional formal arguments is thrown into question. Newman has claimed that our attitude toward a proposition may be one of three; we may doubt it, infer it, or assent to it, and to assent to it is to hold it unconditionally. That unconditional assent may be of two kinds, notional or real. A notional assent is an assent to a proposition whose terms are apprehended as notions; a real assent is an assent to a proposition whose terms stand for things or for images, and Newman says alternately both. The former position, that in real assent the terms of a proposition stand for things, requires a strongly realistic theory of knowledge, which Newman seems to deny. Because the distinction cannot be tied to that between notions and things; because of epistemologicai constraints, nor to singular and general terms, because the relationship is indirect, images assume great importance. But Newman is concerned with assents to many propositions containing terms we cannot imagine in the ordinary sense, consequently "image" is understood broadly. One of those propositions is the proposition "God exists" and Newman offers an argument in its support, an argument from conscience, and he describes the characteristics of a real assent to God's existence. It involves an image especially of the predicate term, which is personal because it arises out of the individual's experience, and practical because images affect our feelings, and we act when our feelings direct us. The argument divides conscience into sanction, or "commanding- ness" and law, or what is commanded. It derives its force from the sanction of conscience; conscience could not have its authority over us, and we would not respond emotionally as we do, if God did not exist. Newman has overlooked traditional metaphysical proofs as a source of the same kind of real, imaginative, assent. Existential interpreters of Thomas Aquinas, and existentialists in general have described quite well the real apprehension of existence which makes possible real assent to the proposition "God exists", and at the same time lends force to the traditional argument from contingent existence. (shrink)

This study will critically examine the moral philosophy of one of existentialism's leading exponents Simone de Beauvoir, as set forth in The Ethics of Ambiguity. The problem of the nature and status of moral values and moral imperatives arises in Beauvoir’s ethics when she denies the existence of objective moral values. The questions are: Why does Beauvoir deny objective values? How does Beauvoir understand the concept of objective values? And, finally, does Beauvoir actually succeed in her attempt to offer an (...) ethical philosophy in spite of her denial of objective values? In the Introduction, the distinction between hypothetical and unconditional imperatives is drawn and the ambiguity of the word 'value' is examined. Objective value is defined and it is claimed that Beauvoir does acknowledge the existence of objective values defined in this sense. The Exposition presents an interpretation and critical analysis of Beauvoir’s ethics and traces the development of her dialectic. Beginning with the Sartrean definition of man, Beauvoir proceeds to discuss ambiguity, freedom and existence, disclosure, subjective attitudes chosen in regard to one’s own freedom and oppression. Each of these topics is examined and shown to be essential to understanding Beauvoir’s views concerning moral values and imperatives. The Conclusion is addressed to the questions of why Beauvoir rejects objective values, what kinds of things she understands objective values to be and argues that in spite of her denial of objective values, Beauvoir does succeed in offering a moral philosophy. Finally, Beauvoir’s significance as a moral philosopher is discussed. (shrink)

This thesis aims at setting forth how J.L. Austin understood the use of the term 'statement.' Austin put forth a doctrine analyzing the different aspects of an utterance. One of these aspects is the type of utterance it is, e.g., a statement rather than a command. Austin called this aspect the illocutionary force of an utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance is distinct from the meaning of the words used in making the utterance. On Austin's own admission, he neglected (...) any discussion of the illocutionary force, or what I will call the claim-making force of statements. It is for this reason that the use of the term 'statement' in his philosophy needs to be examined. In Chapter One, I want to present Austin's development of the illocutionary force thesis in How to Do Things with Words. In the first part of his book, Austin made a sharp distinction between statements and other types of utterances he called performatives, e.g., warning, commanding, judging and promising. The distinction was based on the fact that performatives, unlike statements, were not the kind of things which can be true or false. Performatives do not describe anything. Instead, they are the performing of acts in themselves. I will discuss in this chapter how Austin came to reject this distinction in favor of a distinction between the illocutionary force of an utterance and the other aspects of the utterance, i.e., its locutionary and prelocutionary aspects. Chapter two presents criticisms of the notion of the illocutionary force of an utterance. These criticisms argue that the illocutionary force of an utterance is not distinct from the meaning of the sentence used in making the utterance. They conclude that by unpacking and examining the meaning of the expressions used we will know what illocutionary act has been performed. Chapter three is a rebuttal to the arguments against Austin's notion of illocutionary force that were presented in the previous chapter. By presenting various arguments and examples, I want to show that the criticisms in Chapter two are mistaken. The conclusion reached claims that the meaning of the expressions used in the utterance will not exhaust the utterance's force. We can know one independently of the other. The point of these -two chapters is to offer a background for knowing and understanding the scope and importance of illocutionary force. In chapter four, I begin to discuss the claim-making force of a statement. The chapter involves a discussion of the key terms involved in uttering something with a claim-making force. I also discuss facts and knowledge of the facts. This is to show what should be emphasized and what should not be emphasized in analyzing the claim-making force of a statement if problems are to be avoided. The discussion shows how our knowledge at the time of the utterance is important for knowing that an utterance has a claim-making force. The last chapter begins by discussing some of the relevant elements that are needed in order for an utterance to have a claim-making force. I offer various examples as well, to aid in showing that things like the speaker's status, circumstances, knowledge, reasons and evidence play a role in determining whether an utterance has a claim-making force. To be stating, I must be making a claim about some actual or putative states of affairs based on information to which I have access. For the uttering of a sentence to be a happy act of stating, I must know certain things about certain states of affairs which I have been in a good position to know. This leads me and my audience to understand that my utterance is the making of a truth-claim. (shrink)

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to articulate and defend the following four hypotheses, each of which logically follows from the former hypothesis and/or hypotheses. First, that the structure of human action is intentional, teleological and historicity-laden. Second, based upon the ontological structure of human action, understanding human action takes the form of a narrative description. Third, because understanding human action takes the form of a narrative descripti6n, it follows that the process of understanding human action is modelled or (...) best typified by the process of interpreting a narrative text. Fourth, because at its most basic level, the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures are a narrative of the Divine-human relationship, it is profitable to examine some of the interpretation techniques employed in biblical hermeneutics in order to insure that the ontological structure bf both human action and narrative text is not betrayed or ignored. In the first chapter of this thesis will be developed, each in its turn, what we shall argue is a plausible conception of intentionality, teleology and temporality. By "intentionality" we shall mean the ontological relationship between persons and their world or environment. It is an ontological relation which is basic to the development of epistemology, or, more accurately, hermeneutics. The term "teleology" refers to that type of order which human agents give to actions and events to which they are intentionally bound. Put more simply, teleology shall refer to the logical relationship between ends and means which structures human action. And by "temporality" we mean the overlapping of past experience and future anticipations through the experience of presence. Each of these three structures, as we shall see, is absolutely fundamental for the development of an ontology which corresponds to the agent's description of his own experience. Due to the complexities involved, the development of each structure shall remain somewhat distinct in the first chapter. Coalescence of the three structures discussed in the first chapter will take place in the second. There a comprehensive notion of "narrative understanding" will be developed. Put simply, narrative understanding is a theory for the. interpretation of human action which is sensitive or responsive to the ontology of human being and action as developed in the first chapter. Because the project of interpreting the meaning of human action as it occurs in time is primarily that of the historian, we will take occasion to apply the theory of narrative understanding to situations' similar to those with which the historian deals. In doing so, similarities between the process involved in interpreting a human action and a narrative text or chronicle will be evident. In the third and final chapter, we will simply point specifically in light of the work of Paul Ricoeur, to the plausibility of the third and fourth theses which develop. as a consequence of the first two. We will first attempt to articulate the ontological similarities between human action and narrative texts and specifically the autonomizing capacity of both. Second, the text of Scripture as the "great narrative" will receive special attention. Decidedly less original or developmental in character, the third chapter, as a consequence of the lack of materials, will perform the important function of charting future philosophical and theological ventures. (shrink)

In Conflicting Interpretations of Nietzsche's Will to Power the problem of discovering the nature of the will to power is investigated. Chapter one investigates the conflicting statements that Nietzsche makes about the will to power. Because there are so many contradictory statements interpretations of his writings become useful. The two interpretations that are considered in this paper are Walter Kaufmann's and Martin Heidegger's. Kaufmann's interpretation can be classified as scientific or psychological. Kaufmann believes that the will to power is useful (...) only as a tool for explaining human behavior. He also believes that Nietzsche arrived at his conception of the will to power through empirical observation. Heidegger's interpretation can be classified as metaphysical. He views the will to power as the center of Nietzsche's entire philosophy. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche intended for the will to power to be an explanation of the physical world. In order to evaluate these conflicting interpretations there is a chapter in this paper which investigates Nietzsche's view of art. It is obvious that the will to power and art are closely related in Nietzsche's philosophy so any interpretation of the will to power should conform to his artistic views. Heidegger's view conforms better than Kaufmann's. This paper concludes that Kaufmann seems to understand the early Nietzsche while Heidegger grasps the later, metaphysical Nietzsche. (shrink)

People have a love/hate relationship with rapidly changing healthcare technology. While consumer demand for medical apps continues to grow as rapidly as does supply, healthcare professionals and safety experts worry about the impact of these apps on the health consumer. In response to the rapidly growing mobile healthcare sector, the Food and Drug Administration has put forth guidelines to regulate ‘mobile medical apps’, those health-related apps that are designated as medical devices. In this article, I argue that this decision, to (...) only regulate apps that bill themselves as medical devices, will create a market for ‘off-label’ app use. Further, I will talk about the oft used analogy between off-label apps and off-label pharmaceuticals, showing that off-labeling apps will provide patients none of the benefits that come with a physician prescribing a drug off-label, while exposing the mobile healthcare consumer to significant risks that go significantly beyond those that we know of from prescription drugs. Recognizing that the Food and Drug Administration is not going to be able to significantly change its policies on oversight, I will suggest specific actions to at least mitigate some of the risks associated with off-label app use. (shrink)