In Saint Augustine’s works, especially in The City of God, The Confessions, and On Free Choice of the Will, he offers three features integral to his epistemology: love, reason, and presupposition. By love, Augustine argues that virtuous lovers of God will know the Truth more than those with disordered loves. By reason, Augustine held that reason must guide the journey to Truth. By presupposition, Augustine claimed that the search for Truth only starts from Christian doctrine. While modern philosophers might see (...) a tension when simultaneously holding these three principles in his epistemology, Augustine claimed they were mutually supportive. This article offers an overview of love, reason, and presupposition in Augustine’s theory of knowledge. Furthermore, this bold epistemology can be an encouragement and model for contemporary epistemologists who might try to avoid tension in their theories of knowledge altogether. (shrink)

This paper evaluates a moral system that does not rely on God. M.B. Wilkinson's morality is founded apart from God but can still be consistent with the existence of God. This paper explains and evaluates Wilkinson's attempts to solve the Euthyphro Dilemma and the is/ought gap by establishing a metaphysic and ontology upon which he bases his moral system.

Anselm’s famous ontological argument has not been found wanting for critics who question its soundness or validity. In spite of the sustained contestation, the argument has managed to continue to persist even after thinkers have declared it defunct. In the spirit of the pursuit of novel ways to analyze and reconsider the argument, I have attempted to develop a way to defend the argument from contemporary critiques. In this article, I have proposed an account of the argument with an alternative (...) interpretation of Anselm’s concept of graded existence as well as his conceivability thesis. I have also reduced the scope of the argument for the purpose of making the argument as widely applicable as possible. In the process, I adopted Saul Kripke’s concept of a rigid designator to suggest that, if a thinker takes seriously the argument against infinite temporal or causal regressions, then that thinker’s metaphysical system has likely already assented to Anselm’s conceivability thesis, as well as a uniquely necessary being or object. (shrink)

Whether abortion and infanticide are permissible has been debated for a long time in philosophical literature and continues to this day. In this paper, I will assume without argument that one’s view about the moral status of the fetus and newborn will determine what side he/she comes down on in this debate. I am also proceeding with the assumption that personhood is not a conventional or linguistically effective device that has little or no connection to reality. Persons exist and personhood (...) itself is real. With that being said, I will defend a more controversial claim that will undoubtedly stir a hornet’s nest. This will be stated succinctly but will be defended in greater detail throughout the paper: If the fetus and newborn are not persons, then abortion and infanticide are permissible. If a 3-year-old child is a person but to a lesser degree than a 14-year-old, then the 3-year-old child’s moral status is lower than the 14-year old’s. If no adequate threshold exists conjoined with the fact of metaphysical disparity among human beings that are persons, then no two human persons are moral equals. (shrink)

David Hume, the celebrated Scottish philosopher of the 18th century, wrote a work entitled Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, in which he provides a detailed criticism of several theistic arguments. In the Dialogues there are found 3 interlocutors, each of whom approaches natural religion from a different philosophical standpoint. Cleanthes is the character upon whose argumentation we will mainly focus, as he is the defender of the a posteriori argument from Intelligent Design. Philo, another interlocutor, is a philosophical skeptic who opposes (...) Cleanthes' arguments. Out of the three, many consider Philo's positions to be representative of those of Hume himself. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Philo's objection to Cleanthes' Intelligent Design argument, and to show that the analogy within the ID argument is strong and that it warrants belief in the existence of a designer of the universe. (shrink)

This paper addresses the exceedingly complex nature of God's freedom through the defense of Friedrich Lohmann’s article, “God’s Freedom: Free to be Bound.” The role of God’s creation in his own freedom is explored as well as the idea of omnipotence, negative freedom, positive freedom, and gracious autonomy. This paper affirms the idea that God is simultaneously free and bound to his own creation; God’s own self-restriction leads to his eternal glory. God’s freedom to be bound is seen both in (...) the Old Testament Scriptures as well as the New Testament. For example, God permanently tied himself to the world when Jesus was sent to God’s creation to bring salvation due to his gracious autonomy. Jesus brings forth an even more complex exploration of freedom due to him operating in both a human will and a divine will; Jesus’ free wills affirm the concept of God being free and yet tied to his creation. (shrink)

J.M.E. McTaggart's theory of time proports to demonstrate that there is no such thing as time. Many authors have attempted to defend, object, or rework McTaggart's arguments, however, in this paper I hold that McTaggart's arguments for the unreality of time do not hold. McTaggart's argument rests on an apparent contradiction in the A-series of time. Namely that the A-series is necessary for time and that the A-series necessarily produces a contradiction. In this paper, I attempt to show that this (...) supposed contradiction is actually caused by incorrectly establishing the origin and direction of the descriptor of time needed to understand its progression. (shrink)

Freedom, and in particular, the freedom of human beings, is a hot topic within the field of metaphysics. In this paper, instead of arguing for the truth of a particular position on freedom, I explore whether a particular position, compatibilism, might be consistent with the existence of moral responsibility and retributive justice. To alleviate ambiguity, I construct a model by which the four primary positions on freedom might be clearly understood. I then distinguish between what I call ‘common-sense’ views of (...) moral responsibility, and ‘complex’ views of moral responsibility. I select a particular complex view, which I term the ‘virtue’ theory of moral responsibility, offer some justification for the sensibility of such a theory, and demonstrate how the virtue theory is consistent with compatibilism. Finally, I propose that retributive justice is consistent with the virtue theory of moral responsibility, and consequently, that retributive justice is consistent with compatibilism. (shrink)

In this article, the physicalism of Trenton Merricks is examined in relation to the Christian doctrine of the future resurrection of the body. Merricks' position is found to have serious issues relating to how a person can maintain numerical identity through a process of death and being brought back into existence at the resurrection. Merricks never provides any way of understanding how this is possible. Further, his argument seems to presuppose that human beings are merely physical beings without sufficiently grounding (...) this point. The article concludes that Merricks' physicalism cannot account for the numerical identity which is necessary for the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. (shrink)

As naturalism continues to dominate academia it naturally flows into philosophy of mind. Physicalist theories of mind reduce the mind to only what is material. Philosophers like Jaegwon Kim and Daniel Dennett present forceful arguments against mental states of mind holding causal power at all. This paper will critique arguments from Kim and Dennett regarding physicalist theories of mind and show that the philosopher who does not hold to a naturalist worldview need not be frightened by arguments like Kim or (...) Dennett's. (shrink)

Within this paper, I examine Godless normative realism, a naturalistic explanation of morality given by Erik Wielenberg and determine whether the theory poses a threat to abductive moral arguments for the existence of God. In particular, I argue that Wielenberg’s theory is a possible explanation for the existence of moral facts and that it offers a motivation for one to act morally, but that theism, as a whole, remains a better explanation for the moral aspects of the world. To do (...) so, I defend the legitimacy of weak forms of DCT, identify a few areas in which Godless normative realism fails to explain moral aspects of the world, and conclude with a few reasons for thinking that the explanatory scope of theism is superior to that of Wielenberg’s theory. I conclude that abductive moral arguments for the existence of God remain largely unscathed by Godless normative realism. (shrink)

This paper summarizes a few recent objections to various ontological arguments. I do not weigh one argument against another, nor offer defenses of OAs. This paper only highlights some objections to OAs to synthesize the information in one place. Opponents of the OA argue that despite the many attempts to strengthen Anselm’s original argument it can be shown that OAs fail to offer a theistic proof for God. It has been argued that OAs either offer premises that atheists do not (...) accept, yield invalid results, or have conclusions that have no religious significance. (shrink)

This paper seeks to explain a modern day universe theory derived from Teleology, namely: Intelligent Design, under which Irreducible Complexity and Fine-Tuning fall. By virtue of being derivatives of Teleology, both of these maintain the idea that things are evolving toward a certain end for a certain purpose. Through detailed definitions and examples, it is clear that these theories support each other; the astounding specificity needed for life on earth virtually requires an Intelligent Designer. The paper then explores counter explanations (...) for this seeming impossibility, such as the Anthropic Principle Objection, Unique Universe, and the Multiverse. Each of these theories, in its own way, utterly evades the issue of design and lacks substance enough to be a standalone theory. The Multiverse is a particularly popular theory, yet its need for multiple universes is improbable, and the “universe generator” necessary for the theory’s success would also require the designer whose necessity the theory is trying to negate. The unlikely odds of opposing theories, coupled with quantifiable support from Fine-Tuning and Irreducible Complexity, point to a theistic version of Intelligent Design as the most plausible explanation for the nature of our universe. (shrink)

This paper briefly presents and engages with four competing hypotheses as to the most plausible explanation for the beginning of the universe. After clarifying some terminology, I will first establish both scientific and philosophical reasons for accepting the notion of an absolute beginning over a past eternal universe. Next, I will interact with Lawrence Krauss’ two versions of “nothing” and speculation of a multiverse as possible suggestions for what that first cause might be. In response, I will demonstrate the logical (...) inadequacy of this approach, and by extension all other non-metaphysical theories. Ultimately, I will determine that, due to the logical contradictions inherent in physical explanations, one is epistemically justified in postulating a metaphysical deistic God as the Necessary Being responsible for the material cause of the universe. (shrink)

Ever since J. L. Schellenberg formulated his infamous atheistic argument from hiddenness in his 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, the problem of divine hiddenness--the question of why a good God would hide Himself, even from those actively seeking Him--has troubled theists. Schellenberg's argument from hiddenness has proven notoriously difficult for theists to answer, and perhaps this is why it is now second only to the problem of evil in popularity with atheists. While many theists have tried to find (...) an adequate answer to the problem of hiddenness, and many have made good attempts, no response has been quite complete. Many such replies have been made by Dr. Travis Dumsday of the Concordia University of Edmonton. Dumsday has written prolifically on the subject of divine hiddenness, but in this paper I will look at only three of his replies to Schellenberg's argument from hiddenness. These three responses, while each insufficient on their own, become a far more formidable reply to the problem of hiddenness when combined and synthesized around a more mystic conception of God imported from the Christian mystic tradition. Drawing upon the mysticism of Saint Francis of Assisi and the rigorous philosophy of Dumsday, I argue that the great mystery that we call God remains hidden in order to preserve the well-being of nonbelievers, and that He does indeed reveal Himself, but only to those who cultivate the requisite level of moral virtue and seek Him diligently. (shrink)

Many thinkers hold the following five propositions are inconsistent: The dynamic theory of time is correct God is atemporal God knows tensed facts Free human actions are possible God interacts responsively with humans This working paper uses the discussion in Four Views: God and Time as a starting-point and moves towards explaining how these propositions are consistent.

This paper attempts to show through the modern literature that Social Trinitarianism is a more plausible explanation of the Trinity than Latin Trinitarianism. It will look at ST's solution to Trinitarian procession and LT's likeness to modalism. It will focus on essays written in response to Keith Ward’s Christ and the Cosmos and shall offer a new way to speak of the Trinity through the combining of the methodology proposed by H. E. Barber and Richard Swinburne’s view of necessity and (...) procession. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that the doctrine of divine simplicity suffers from difficulties which undermine its plausibility. The main difficulties explored are Plantinga’s problem of double identification, Pruss’ multiple attributes problem, and Schmitt’s co-specificity problem. In more recent years, defenders of the doctrine have offered a way out of these problems by interpreting it in light of a truthmaker account of predication. This paper analyzes this recent defense, among others, and attempts to show that this new interpretation of divine (...) simplicity still has problems which undermine the plausibility of the doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper I seek to summarize and critique John Rist’s article “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination.” Rist treats Augustine with honesty. When someone is as prominent, loved, and recognized as Augustine, when someone has as much authority as he does, the temptation to manipulate his writings into saying things which agree with one’s own position is strong. Rist resists this temptation, even concluding that Augustine holds a position on free will and predestination which Rist finds highly objectionable. But (...) in his objections to Augustine’s position, Rist does not do justice to the whole system of Augustine’s thought. In my critique I will focus on two points where Rist takes issue with Augustine: 1) Augustine’s lack of an account of how God acts justly in election and 2) the demeaning of man to the level of a “puppet.” I will attempt to demonstrate that Rist’s criticisms are accounted for by extending Augustine’s teachings of, regarding 1), causality and the will and, in regard to 2), the solidarity of humanity with Adam. The aim of this paper is not to prove that Augustine’s articulation of free will and God’s predestination is the correct one but only that his position can withstand the criticisms Rist brings against it. (shrink)

In his work entitled "On Power," famous Muslim philosopher al-Ghazali lays out his particular brand of occasionalism. Al-Ghazali views god as the ultimate cause for everything that is logically possible, including the acts of man. In this paper, al-Ghazali's occasionalism is fully fleshed out to reveal what appear to be his true views on both God and man's power and the implications of such views.

This paper argues that Molinism best rebuts the problem of natural evil when compared to the attempts of Open Theists, particularly William Hasker. The author begins by summarizing Hasker's own Natural Order Theodicy, and subsequently critiques it. He finds no issues with the proposed theodicy, but takes issue with Hasker's attempt to establish the coherence of Open Theism from this theodicy. He then explains the weaknesses of Open Theism's response to natural evil, and simultaneously argues for the strength of Molinism's (...) response. He concludes that Open Theism leaves God as a reckless risk-taker, and therefore Molinism provides a better response to the problem of natural evil. (shrink)

This paper responds to Wesley Cray’s article “Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship.” According to Cray, “an omniscient being is one that instantiates all propositional and experiential knowledge,” and no person can have that entire body knowledge. Contrary to Cray, this paper indicates that God’s omniscience implies full propositional knowledge, but only experiential knowledge that is great-making and non-composite. The central argument this paper proposes is that experiential knowledge does not imply that one has had that experience; for God, experiential knowledge (...) may come from a variety of avenues. This article concludes with alternative arguments against Cray’s formulation of God. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore the concept of infinity regarding the nature of God, by responding to several criticisms regarding the concept of an infinite being. Andrew Lavin, in his article The Theological use of Infinity explains that the concept of an infinite God is inconsistent, and suggests that a finite God would be more conceivable. This paper analyzes each of Lavin's objections and his reasoning behind them as well as his understanding of the concept of infinity in itself.

This paper attempts to defend the attributes of omnipotence and omnibenevolence in light of evil. Possible worlds can be used to show that God perhaps has reasons for permiting evil, and these reasons can reconcile God's attributes with the existence of evil. Using Plantinga's Freewill Defense, free will is seen to be a conduit for moral good, but because of transworld depravity, some evil is present along with this good. Flemming objects to this account and seeks something stronger. Through evil's (...) presence, we learn to identify it and learn to show benevolence to one another in light of its presence. Eleonore Stump's work on suffering is used to show that there are spiritual goods that suffering can bring. Suffering is used to bring us into relationship with God and this is an indispensable good, according to Aquinas. God’s omnipotence and omnibenevolence can be defended in light of evil. (shrink)

God’s temporality is still debated today by theologians and philosophers with whether God is temporal, atemporal, or some other form of temporality. The context of this paper is the topic of God’s timelessness with the idea of William Lane Craig’s idea of “omnitemporality.” The paper discusses a few of the major arguments for God’s temporality and also God’s timelessness. The paper then analyzes Craig’s article defending the omnitemporality of God declaring that God is non-temporal without creation and then becomes temporal (...) with creation. Though this idea may seem as a possible solution to the question of God’s temporality, it fails to follow with the Kalam argument and the relationship of time and change, for any possibility of change requires some duration of time. (shrink)