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Summary This category is used for topics that have not been a focus of major attention in the free will debate and which therefore do not have categories of their own devoted to them. 
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  1. Gan Hun Ahn (1999). The Free Will/Determinism Controversy: Its Implications for Moral Reasoning and Education. Dissertation, University of Missouri - Kansas City
    The purpose of this study is to propose a theory of moral education based on a concept of moral freedom that is philosophically sound and educationally meaningful. This was achieved through a critical analysis of several major positions regarding the free will/determinism controversy. ;The free will problem is examined in terms of the trichotomy of nonreconciling determinism/reconciling determinism/libertarianism. and by the dichotomy of incompatibilism vs. compatibilism. This study defends reconciling determinism in the trichotomy and compatibilism in the dichotomy. The difference (...)
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  2. Robert F. Allen, Free Will and Evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "Free Will Nihilism and the Question of Method".
    Noel Hendrickson believes that free will is separable from the “evaluative intuitions” with which it has been traditionally associated. But what are these intuitions? Answer: principles such as PAP, Β, and UR (6). The thesis that free will is separable from these principles, however, is hardly unique, as they are also eschewed by compatibilists who are unwilling to abdicate altogether evaluative intuitions. We are told in addition that there are “metaphysical senses” of free will that are not “relevant to responsibility” (...)
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  3. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-Constitution. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Drawing on David Velleman’s earlier work, Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value and free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is (...)
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  4. Edwina Barvosa-Carter (2007). Mestiza Autonomy as Relational Autonomy: Ambivalence & the Social Character of Free Will. Journal of Political Philosophy 15 (1):1–21.
  5. Nicholas Beale (2009). Freewill, Free Process, and Love. Think 8 (23):115-124.
    Of all the philosophical challenges to theism in general and Christianity in particular, the one that Christians take most seriously is the Problem of Evil. It is clearly not logically contradictory to hold that there exists a Loving Ultimate Creator; and nevertheless there is a very substantial amount of evil and suffering in the world. But it is certainly problematic. Deeper scientific understandings of physics and evolution shed some light on this. It is also useful to reflect more deeply on (...)
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  6. S. I. Benn & W. L. Weinstein (1971). Being Free to Act, and Being a Free Man. Mind 80 (318):194-211.
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  7. Philip W. Bennett (1973). Evil, God, and the Free Will Defense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):39 – 50.
    The author critically examines and rejects alvin plantinga's defense of the free will theodicy, As presented in chapter six of plantinga's "god and other minds". If the author's arguments are correct, Then any attempt on the part of the rational apologist to explain evil by reference to man's free will must be considered futile. Since the arguments presented will be seen as supporting natural atheology (which, For plantinga, Is "the attempt...To show that, Given what we know, It is impossible or (...)
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  8. Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
  9. Paul H. Benson (1987). Ordinary Ability and Free Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335.
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  10. S. Benson (1987). Freedom and Value. Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
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  11. George Botterill (1977). Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defence. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (107):114-134.
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  12. R. D. Bradley (1958). Free Will: Problem of Pseudo-Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45.
  13. Shoshana Brassfield (2013). Cartesian Virtue and Freedom: Introduction. Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):1.
  14. Walter E. Broman (1989). Milton and Free Will: An Essay in Criticism and Philosophy (Review). Philosophy and Literature 13 (1):179-180.
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  15. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism. Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.
  16. Steven M. Cahn (1967). Fate, Logic, and Time. New Haven, Yale University Press.
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  17. James Cain (2004). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
    According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free will would be exercised sinlessly. Thus, it is held, the (...)
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  18. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  19. Gregg Caruso (2014). Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014) provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will (2001). Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally (...)
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  20. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
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  21. Gregg Caruso (2008). Consciousness and Free Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
  22. Gregg D. Caruso (forthcoming). Free Will Eliminativism: Reference, Error, and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will does not exist. However, an alternative (...)
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  23. Gregg D. Caruso (2014). Precis of Derk Perebooms Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Science Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Perebooms Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014) provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will (2001). Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally (...)
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  24. Luca Castagnoli (2011). The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ancient Philosophy 31 (1):228-235.
  25. Desmonde Clarke Catherine Wilson (ed.) (forthcoming). Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  26. Christopher Key Chapple (2014). Free Will and Voluntarism in Jainism. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press
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  27. Sean Clancy (2013). A Strong Compatibilist Account of Settling. Inquiry 56 (6):653-665.
  28. Randolph Clarke (2010). Are We Free to Obey the Laws? American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):389-401.
    It is often said that if free will is incompatible with determinism, then free actions must be anomic, not covered by any law of nature. Here it is argued that there is no need for incompatiblists to hold this view. Even if freedom requires indeterminism, our freedom can be freedom to obey the laws.
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  29. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (2007). The Development of Freedom. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:35-52.
    This paper elaborates four asymmetrical, developmental stages of the phenomenon of human freedom, starting with a rudimentary sort of freedom, thebasic experience of a relatively unencumbered power to act in alternative ways. The paper argues that structural elements of this rudimentary form of freedomare demonstrable in three distinct, supervening forms of freedom: instrumental freedom, the experience of the self-reflective ability to pursue certain aims, perfectionist freedom, the experience of the capacity to master oneself according to some ideal, and, finally, interpersonal (...)
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  30. Paul Davis (1989). The Cheap Tricks of Compatibilism and Why the Problem of Free Will Won't Go Away. Dissertation, The University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)
    Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In common with a great many philosophical problems, free will/determinism has something of a chequered history. In the same way in which it may come more easily to say what it is that empiricism denies rather than what it asserts, we could fairly painlessly grant the likes of Strawson that the terms "free will" and "determinism" do not each, within philosophical history, mark off single unambiguous theories going up (...)
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  31. Russell Ernest Daw (1995). Free Will and Determinism: An Assessment of the Traditional Approach to the Compatibility Issue. Dissertation, University of Virginia
    This dissertation is a systematic and fairly comprehensive assessment of the way in which philosophers have traditionally approached the issue of whether determinism is compatible with the sort of freedom that allows for ascriptions of moral responsibility. After providing a brief historical overview of a line of argument regarding the compatibility of free-will and determinism that runs from Hobbes through Hume, Mill, Moore, Schlick, Ayer, and numerous others, I draw out the methodological assumptions implicit in that line of argument: The (...)
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  32. Russell Daw & Torin Alter (2001). Free Acts and Robot Cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57.
    (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
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  33. Charles Devellennes (2014). Choice, Blind Spots and Free Will An Autopoietic Critique of Isaiah Berlin's Liberalism. Philosophy and Social Criticism 40 (9):895-911.
    This article shows that the concept of choice is central to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism. It argues that his valuing of choice is anchored in a particular conception of human nature, one that assumes and presupposes free will. Berlin’s works sketch a metaphysics of choice, and his reluctance to situate himself openly in the debate on free will is unconvincing. By introducing the theory of autopoiesis, this article further suggests that there is a way to take Berlin’s value pluralism seriously, by (...)
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  34. Frank B. Dilley (1990). The Free-Will Defence and Worlds Without Moral Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 27 (1/2):1 - 15.
  35. Richard Double (1989). Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.
    The objection to R-S accounts that was raised by the possibility of external agents requires the acceptance of two premises, viz., that all R-S accounts allow for puppeteers and that puppeteers necessarily make us unfree. The Metaphilosophical reply shows that to the extent that puppeteers are more problematic than determinism per se, pup-peteers may be explicitly excluded since they violate our paradigm of free will. The Metaphilosophical reply also suggests that we should not expect our mature R-S account to supply (...)
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  36. Matej Drascek & Stane Maticic (2008). What Managers Could See in the Philosophical Block of “Free Will”? Journal of Business Ethics 81 (1):1 - 14.
    Business ethics’ theories have come under a lot of criticism lately. The problem has been the lack of a philosophical base or the inadequate implementation of it. We are trying to solve this problem by examining the roots of ethics and then applying it to the business environment. The root that has been undeservedly overlooked has been the concept of free will, the oldest philosophical problem on which every ethics theory lies. We have chosen two theories that we think would (...)
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  37. Carol S. Dweck & Daniel C. Molden (2008). 4 Self-Theories: The Construction of Free Will. In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press 44.
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  38. William Dwyer (2001). Do Knowledge, Ethics, and Liberty Require Free Will? [REVIEW] Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 3 (1):83 - 108.
    William Dwyer reviews Initiative: Human Agency and Society, in which Tibor Machan argues that free will is a prerequisite for knowledge, ethics, and political liberty. Machan criticizes Hayek, Stigler, and "public choice" economics for their economic determinism and for discounting the importance of abstract ideas. Despite making a good case against environmental and economic determinism, Machan fails adequately to defend his central thesis that free will exists and that it is required for normative values.
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  39. John Martin Fischer (2005). Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of Narrative. Philosophical Papers 34 (3):379-403.
    In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us (...)
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  40. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (2005). Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge.
    Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous amount of philosophical work in the Anglo-American tradition on the cluster of topics pertaining to Free Will. Of course, this work has in many instances built on and extended the historical treatments of this great area of philosophical interest. The issues range from fairly abstract philosophical questions about the logic of arguments about human freedom (and its relationship to prior predictability of our choices and actions, or God's foreknowledge, or causal (...)
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  41. Antony Flew (1964). Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom. In Hibbert Journal. New York, Macmillan 195.
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  42. P. Forrest (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):542-542.
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  43. Bernard Forthomme (2010). Les Aventures de la Volonté Perverse. Lessius.
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  44. Francis Galton (1884). Free-Will--Observations and Inferences. Mind 9 (35):406-413.
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  45. Martin Ganeri (2014). Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Rāmānuja. In Matthew R. Dasti & Edwin F. Bryant (eds.), Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. Oxford University Press 232.
  46. Ken Gemes (2009). Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual. In Ken Gemes & Simon May (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Oxford University Press 321-338.
    [Ken Gemes] In some texts Nietzsche vehemently denies the possibility of free will; in others he seems to positively countenance its existence. This paper distinguishes two different notions of free will. Agency free will is intrinsically tied to the question of agency, what constitutes an action as opposed to a mere doing. Deserts free will is intrinsically tied to the question of desert, of who does and does not merit punishment and reward. It is shown that we can render Nietzsche's (...)
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  47. Clark Glymour (2004). We Believe in Freedom of the Will so That We Can Learn. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):661-662.
    The central theoretical issue of Wegner's book is: Why do we have the illusion of conscious will? I suggest that learning requires belief in the autonomy of action. You should believe in freedom of the will because if you have it you're right, and if you don't have it you couldn't have done otherwise anyway. —Sam Buss (Lecture at University of California, San Diego, 2000).
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  48. Stewart Goetz (2013). Laws, Mind, and Free Will, by Steven Horst. Mind 122 (486):fzt062.
  49. Neil K. Goodell (2007). To Think or Not: A Structural Resolution to the Mind-Body and Free Will-Determinism Problem. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 9 (1):1 - 51.
    The mind-body and free will-determinism problem is presented as an instance of the more general top-down versus bottom-up process model. The construct of a metaphysical hierarchy consisting of 3 levels (matter, life and mind) is introduced, with each level governed by emergent, non-overlapping fundamental causal forces. Rand's theories of epistemology, language, and volition are shown to be inherently circular and impossible to be true. The concepts of metaphysical identity and epistemological identity are introduced. Metaphysics and epistemology are recharacterized in exclusively (...)
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  50. David Gordon (1975). Free-Will and the Undesirability of Moral Education. Educational Theory 25 (4):407-416.
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