Kane provides Self-Forming Actions as a rebuttal to allegations that indeterministic choices are determined by luck and are therefore not free. This paper explicates Kane’s proposal and provides a conceptual complication for Kane’s SFAs. The quantum events in an indeterministic world can be recreated in a deterministic world by pseudorandom number generation. This deterministic world is indistinguishable from the indeterministic world it simulates at the quantum, neurological, and phenomenological levels. Thus, indeterministic quantum behavior cannot secure free will in Kane’s SFAs (...) in any way which is not reproducible in a deterministic world. The paper addresses the objections that the proposed problem is merely an epistemic rather than metaphysical one and that a deterministic agent does not have plural voluntary control. I conjecture that a dualistic account of libertarian free will may dodge the problems I raise regarding Kane’s SFAs. (shrink)