Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition

Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106 (2012)
This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2012.670718
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Benjamin Jarvis (2014). Evaluating the Extended Mind. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):209-229.

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