Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition

Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world

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2012-05-22

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Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

Dewey on extended cognition and epistemology.Krist Vaesen - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):426-438.
Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?Hadeel Naeem - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):350-367.
Evaluating the extended mind.Benjamin Jarvis - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):209-229.

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References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.
Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345 - 381.

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