Distinguishing virtue epistemology and extended cognition

Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):91 - 106 (2012)
Abstract
This paper pursues two lines of thought that help characterize the differences between some versions of virtue epistemology and the hypothesis that cognitive processes are realized by brain, body, and world
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    References found in this work BETA
    Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
    Andy Clark (1998). Author's Response. Metascience 7 (1):95-104.

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    Shannon Spaulding (2012). Overextended Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
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