“Suppose I Am Pricked with a Pin”: Locke, Reid and the Implications of Representationalism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2):149-165 (2017)
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Margaret Atherton
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

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Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.Marina Folescu - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):57-74.

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