Acategoriality as Mental Instability. A Dynamical Systems Approach to James’s Account of Mental Activity

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In Sergio Franzese (ed.), Fringes of Religious Experience, Cross-Perspectives on James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Ontos Verlag. pp. 39-68 (2007)
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10.1515/9783110328363.39

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