David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445 (2006)
Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, the global controller nullifies freedom because she is an agent, whereas natural forces are at work in conventional deterministic worlds. Other key differences that undermine the analogy are identified. It is also shown that the argument begs the question against the classical compatibilist, who believes that determinism does not preclude alternative possibilities.
|Keywords||Control Determinism Freedom Global Incompatibilism Manipulation Metaphysics|
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References found in this work BETA
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Mckenna (2008). A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
Michael McKenna (2012). Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.
Eric Christian Barnes (2015). Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation. Noûs 49 (3):560-588.
Michael McKenna (2012). Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):264-280.
Yishai Cohen (2015). The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism. Philosophia 43 (2):291-307.
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