David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20 (1971)
It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
|Keywords||Desire Freedom Metaphysics Person Will|
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Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
Michael McKenna (2008). Frankfurt's Argument Against Alternative Possibilities: Looking Beyond the Examples. Noûs 42 (4):770-793.
J. L. Schellenberg (2013). God, Free Will, and Time: The Free Will Offense Part II. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):1-10.
David Faraci & David Shoemaker (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
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