Freedom of the will and the concept of a person

Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20 (1971)
Abstract
It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.
Keywords Desire  Freedom  Metaphysics  Person  Will
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J. L. Schellenberg (2013). God, Free Will, and Time: The Free Will Offense Part II. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):1-10.

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