Search results for 'Determinism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gregg Caruso, Origination, Moral Responsibility, Punishment, and Life-Hopes: Ted Honderich on Determinism and Freedom.
    Perhaps no one has written more extensively, more deeply, and more insightfully about determinism and freedom than Ted Honderich. His influence and legacy with regard to the problem of free will—or the determinism problem, as he prefers to frame it—looms large. In these comments I would like to focus on three main aspects of Honderich ’s work: his defense of determinism and its consequences for origination and moral responsibility; his concern that the truth of determinism threatens (...)
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  2. Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe (2015). What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism? Cognitive Science 40 (3).
    Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features. We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were (...)
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  3. Mauro Dorato (2002). Determinism, Chance, and Freedom. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic 321--38.
    After a brief but necessary characterization of the notion of determinism, I discuss and critically evaluate four views on the relationship between determinism and free will by taking into account both (i) what matters most to us in terms of a free will worth-wanting and (ii) which capacities can be legitimately attributed to human beings without contradicting what we currently know from natural sciences. The main point of the paper is to argue that the libertarian faces a dilemma: (...)
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  4. Eddy Nahmias (2011). Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing. In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd Ed. Oxford University Press
    It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, (...)
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  5.  23
    Sofia Jeppsson (forthcoming). Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the relevant ‘can’ is incompatibilist. In this paper, I argue that even if the first step of the argument for reason incompatibilism succeeds, the second (...)
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  6.  82
    Marij van Strien (2014). The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):167-185.
    The recent discovery of an indeterministic system in classical mechanics, the Norton dome, has shown that answering the question whether classical mechanics is deterministic can be a complicated matter. In this paper I show that indeterministic systems similar to the Norton dome were already known in the nineteenth century: I discuss four nineteenth century authors who wrote about such systems, namely Poisson, Duhamel, Boussinesq and Bertrand. However, I argue that their discussion of such systems was very different from the contemporary (...)
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  7. Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron (2009). The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism and Ontology. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291 - 309.
    In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.
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  8.  91
    John Earman (1986). A Primer on Determinism. D. Reidel.
    Determinism is a perennial topic of philosophical discussion. Very little acquaintance with the philosophical literature is needed to reveal the Tower of ...
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  9. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an (...)
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  10. Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano (2013). Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science:17-37.
    The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly or indirectly upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the view that most people have (...)
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  11. Peter van Inwagen (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (March):185-99.
    In this paper I shall define a thesis I shall call ' determinism ', and argue that it is incompatible with the thesis that we are able to act otherwise than we do. Other theses, some of them very different from what I shall call ' determinism ', have at least an equal right to this name, and, therefore, I do not claim to show that every thesis that could be called ' determinism ' without historical impropriety (...)
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  12.  69
    Marij van Strien (2014). On the Origins and Foundations of Laplacian Determinism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):24-31.
    In this paper I examine the foundations of Laplace's famous statement of determinism in 1814, and argue that rather than derived from his mechanics, this statement is based on general philosophical principles, namely the principle of sufficient reason and the law of continuity. It is usually supposed that Laplace's statement is based on the fact that each system in classical mechanics has an equation of motion which has a unique solution. But Laplace never proved this result, and in fact (...)
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  13.  79
    Maria Brincker (2015). Evolution Beyond Determinism - on Dennett's Compatibilism and the Too Timeless Free Will Debate. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):39-74.
    Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism (...)
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  14.  9
    Gabriel De Marco (forthcoming). Determinism’ Is Just Fine: A Reply to Scott Sehon. Philosophia:1-9.
    Scott Sehon recently argued that the standard notion of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument makes it so that, if our world turns out to be deterministic, then an interventionist God is logically impossible. He further argues that because of this, we should revise our notion of determinism. In this paper I show that Sehon’s argument for the claim that the truth of determinism, in this sense, would make an interventionist God logically impossible ultimately fails. I then (...)
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  15. Oisín Deery (2015). Is Agentive Experience Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):2-19.
    Many philosophers think not only that we are free to act otherwise than we do, but also that we experience being free in this way. Terry Horgan argues that such experience is compatibilist: it is accurate even if determinism is true. According to Horgan, when people judge their experience as incompatibilist, they misinterpret it. While Horgan's position is attractive, it incurs significant theoretical costs. I sketch an alternative way to be a compatibilist about experiences of free agency that avoids (...)
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  16.  36
    Kimberly Brewer & Eric Watkins (2012). A Difficulty Still Awaits: Kant, Spinoza, and the Threat of Theological Determinism. Kant-Studien 103 (2):163-187.
    In a short and much-neglected passage in the second Critique, Kant discusses the threat posed to human freedom by theological determinism. In this paper we present an interpretation of Kant’s conception of and response to this threat. Regarding his conception, we argue that he addresses two versions of the threat: either God causes appearances (and hence our spatio-temporal actions) directly or he does so indirectly by causing things in themselves which in turn cause appearances. Kant’s response to the first (...)
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  17. Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.
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  18. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to (...)
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  19. Robert H. Kane (2002). Free Will, Determinism, and Indeterminism. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic 371--406.
  20. Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press 249.
    In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address (...)
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  21.  29
    Olivier Sartenaer (2015). Emergent Evolutionism, Determinism and Unpredictability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51 (2):62-68.
    The fact that there exist in nature thoroughly deterministic systems whose future behavior cannot be predicted, no matter how advanced or fined-tune our cognitive and technical abilities turn out to be, has been well established over the last decades or so, essentially in the light of two different theoretical frameworks, namely chaos theory and (some deterministic interpretation of) quantum mechanics. The prime objective of this paper is to show that there actually exists an alternative strategy to ground the divorce between (...)
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  22.  86
    Eric Cator & Klaas Landsman (2014). Constraints on Determinism: Bell Versus Conway–Kochen. Foundations of Physics 44 (7):781-791.
    Bell’s Theorem from Physics 36:1–28 (1964) and the (Strong) Free Will Theorem of Conway and Kochen from Notices AMS 56:226–232 (2009) both exclude deterministic hidden variable theories (or, in modern parlance, ‘ontological models’) that are compatible with some small fragment of quantum mechanics, admit ‘free’ settings of the archetypal Alice and Bob experiment, and satisfy a locality condition akin to parameter independence. We clarify the relationship between these theorems by giving reformulations of both that exactly pinpoint their resemblance and their (...)
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  23. Timo Jütten (2012). Adorno on Kant, Freedom and Determinism. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):548-574.
    In this paper I argue that Adorno's metacritique of freedom in Negative Dialectics and related texts remains fruitful today. I begin with some background on Adorno's conception of ‘metacritique’ and on Kant's conception of freedom, as I understand it. Next, I discuss Adorno's analysis of the experiential content of Kantian freedom, according to which Kant has reified the particular social experience of the early modern bourgeoisie in his conception of unconditioned freedom. Adorno argues against this conception of freedom and suggests (...)
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  24. Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.
    In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had (...)
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  25.  31
    Boris Kožnjak (2015). Who Let the Demon Out? Laplace and Boscovich on Determinism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:42-52.
    In this paper, I compare Pierre-Simon Laplace's celebrated formulation of the principle of determinism in his 1814 Essai philosophique sur les probabilités with the formulation of the same principle offered by Roger Joseph Boscovich in his Theoria philosophiae naturalis, published 56 years earlier. This comparison discloses a striking general similarity between the two formulations of determinism as well as certain important differences. Regarding their similarities, both Boscovich's and Laplace's conceptions of determinism involve two mutually interdependent components—ontological and (...)
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  26.  61
    Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.) (2002). Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    These and other questions emphasize the fact that chance and choice are two leading actors on stage whenever issues of determinism are under discussion. ...
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  27. Marvin Zimmerman (1966). Is Free Will Incompatible with Determinism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.
    If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so (...)
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  28.  57
    Yair Schlein (2014). Fatalism, Determinism and Free Will as the Axiomatic Foundations of Rival Moral World Views. Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 22 (1):53-62.
    One of the prominent questions of moral thought throughout history is the question of moral responsibility. In other words, to what measure do human actions result from free will rather than from being subordinate to a common “predetermined” law. In ancient Greece, this question was associated with mythical figures like Moira and Ananke while in recent times it is connected with concepts such as determinism and compatibilism. The argument between these two world views crosses cultures and historical periods, giving (...)
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  29. Galen Strawson (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism. Inquiry 32 (March):3-27.
    This article begins with some brief reflexions on the definition of determinism (II), on the notion of the subject of experience (III), and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events (IV). The main discussion (V?XIII) focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ?life?hopes'). It (...)
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  30. C. Taylor & Daniel C. Dennett (2002). Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press 257--277.
    Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will.
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  31.  30
    Thomas Müller (2015). Time and Determinism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):729-740.
    This paper gives an overview of logico-philosophical issues of time and determinism. After a brief review of historical roots and 20th century developments, three current research areas are discussed: the definition of determinism, space-time indeterminism, and the temporality of individual things and their possibilities.
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  32.  54
    Charles T. Wolfe (2007). Determinism/Spinozism in the Radical Enlightenment: The Cases of Anthony Collins and Denis Diderot”. International Review of Eighteenth-Century Studies 1 (1):37-51.
    In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some (...)
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  33. Charles T. Wolfe (2010). Locke’s Compatibilism: Suspension of Desire or Suspension of Determinism? In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press
    In Book II, chapter xxi of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, on ‘Power’, Locke presents a radical critique of free will. This is the longest chapter in the Essay, and it is a difficult one, not least since Locke revised it four times without always taking care to ensure that every part cohered with the rest. My interest is to work out a coherent statement of what would today be termed ‘compatibilism’ from this text – namely, a doctrine which seeks (...)
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  34.  87
    Jiri Benovsky (2013). Branching and (in)Determinism. Philosophical Papers 42 (2):151-173.
    At a first glance, and even at a second one, it seems that if time is linear the threat of determinism is more severe than if time is branching, since in the latter case the future is open in a way it is not in the former one where, so to speak, there exists only one branch – one future. In this paper, I want to give a 'third glance' at this claim. I acknowledge that such a claim is (...)
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  35.  47
    Christopher Evan Franklin (2014). Powers, Necessity, and Determinism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):225-229.
    Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum have argued that a theory of free will that appeals to a powers-based ontology is incompatible with causal determinism. This is a surprising conclusion since much recent work on the intersection of the metaphysics of powers and free will has consisted of attempts to defend compatibilism by appealing to a powers-based ontology. In response I show that their argument turns on an equivocation of ‘all events are necessitated’.
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  36. Mark Balaguer (2009). Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting Version of Determinism. Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.
    This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at (...)
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  37.  52
    Mark Philpott (1996). Not Guilty By Reason of Genetic Determinism. In Henry Tam (ed.), Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development. Avebury 95-112.
    In February 1994, Stephen Mobley was convicted of the murder of John Collins. Mobley's lawyers attempted to introduce genetic evidence in an attempt to have Mobley's sentence reduced from death to life imprisonment. I examine the prospects for appeal to genetic determinism as a criminal defense. Guided by existing standards for insanity defenses, I argue that a genetic defense might be allowable in exceptional cases but will not be generally available as some have worried.
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  38.  4
    Christopher Hughes (2015). The Consequence Argument and the Definition of Determinism. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 71 (4):705-724.
    Resumo Peter van Inwagen no seu An Essay of Free Will e, no muito mais tarde, “The Consequence Argument” formula várias versões daquilo que designou por “o argumento de consequência”. van Inwagen descreveu o “argumento da consequência” como um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Contudo, o autor deste artigo argumenta que a mais recente formulação do argumento da consequência não é, tal como está, um argumento para a incompatibilidade do determinismo com o livre arbítrio. Embora (...)
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  39. Maria Kronfeldner (2009). Genetic Determinism and the Innate-Acquired Distinction. Medicine Studies 1 (2):167-181.
    This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under (...)
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  40.  20
    Michael Esfeld (2015). Bell’s Theorem and the Issue of Determinism and Indeterminism. Foundations of Physics 45 (5):471-482.
    The paper considers the claim that quantum theories with a deterministic dynamics of objects in ordinary space-time, such as Bohmian mechanics, contradict the assumption that the measurement settings can be freely chosen in the EPR experiment. That assumption is one of the premises of Bell’s theorem. I first argue that only a premise to the effect that what determines the choice of the measurement settings is independent of what determines the past state of the measured system is needed for the (...)
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  41.  91
    Göran Duus-Otterström (2008). Betting Against Hard Determinism. Res Publica 14 (3):219-235.
    The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian (...)
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  42. Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
    Most philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free will. Assuming the correctness of this concession, that leaves compatibilism and hard determinism as the only remaining choices in the free will debate. In this paper, I will argue that hard determinism turns out to be a form of compatibilism, and therefore, compatibilism is the only remaining position in the free will debate. I will attempt to establish this conclusion by arguing that hard determinists will (...)
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  43.  18
    Manuel R. Vargas (2015). On Maurice Mandelbaum’s “Determinism and Moral Responsibility”. Ethics 125 (3):854-856,.
    It is sometimes instructive to reflect on a problem as it appeared before our current philosophical presumptions became ingrained. In this context, Maurice Mandelbaum’s “Determinism and Moral Responsibility” is of particular interest. Published in 1960, it appeared only a few years before the wave of work that gave us much of our contemporary understanding of moral responsibility, free will, and determinism. Mandelbaum’s account repays reconsideration. Mandelbaum argues that (1) there is an underappreciated threat to “determinist” or compatibilist accounts (...)
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  44.  96
    Charles B. Guignon (2002). Ontological Presuppositions of the Determinism--Free Will Debate. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic 321--338.
  45. Carl Hoefer (2005). Causality and Determinism: Tension, or Outright Conflict? Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):99-115.
    In the philosophical tradition, the notions of determinism and causality are strongly linked: it is assumed that in a world of deterministic laws, causality may be said to reign supreme; and in any world where the causality is strong enough, determinism must hold. I will show that these alleged linkages are based on mistakes, and in fact get things almost completely wrong. In a deterministic world that is anything like ours, there is no room for genuine causation. Though (...)
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  46.  70
    Leigh C. Vicens (2012). Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
    In this paper I consider the view, held by some Thomistic thinkers, that divine determinism is compatible with human freedom, even though natural determinism is not. After examining the purported differences between divine and natural determinism, I discuss the Consequence Argument, which has been put forward to establish the incompatibility of natural determinism and human freedom. The Consequence Argument, I note, hinges on the premise that an action ultimately determined by factors outside of the actor’s control (...)
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  47. Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Kant’s Critique of Determinism in Empirical Psychology. In H. Robinson (ed.), Proceedings of the 8th International Kant Congress. Marquette University Press
    The debate about the relation between the (phenomenal) psychological realm and our (noumenal) rational freedom is moot because Kant in fact argues that psychological determinism is undemonstrable, even in the phenomenal realm. Kant contends that causality is strictly related to substance. Also, the three Analogies form a mutually integrated set of principles. Kant’s Paralogisms show we have no knowledge of a substantial self. If we have no evidence of a substantial self, then we cannot apply any of the Principles (...)
     
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  48.  55
    Enrique Bonete (2013). Neuroethics in Spain: Neurological Determinism or Moral Freedom? Neuroethics 6 (1):225-232.
    Spanish culture has recently shown interest about Neuroethics, a new line of research and reflection. It can be said that two general, and somewhat opposing, perspectives are currently being developed in Spain about neuroethics-related topics. One originates from the neuroscientific field and the other from the philosophical field. We will see, throughout this article, that the Spanish authors, who I am going to select here, deal with very diverse neuroethical topics and that they analyse them from different intellectual assumptions. However, (...)
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  49.  89
    Clement Dore (1963). Is Free Will Compatible with Determinism? Philosophical Review 72 (October):500-501.
    If we maintain that free will requires the absence of determinism, Then can we claim to be free without any wants? if we had no wants at all, What sense would there to be talk about free will? the difference between free will and the absence of free will is not that between indeterminism and determinism. Free choice presupposes determinism in that in order to make a choice an individual must have some motive or reason for so (...)
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  50.  86
    Helen Steward (2006). Determinism and Inevitability. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):535-563.
    The paper discusses one of the central arguments in Dennett’s Freedom Evolves, an argument designed to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. It suggests that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. A second interpretation is then developed, but it is argued that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, (...)
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