Part II: Applications of process-based theories: Process and emergence: Normative function and representation

Axiomathes 14 (1-3):121-155 (2004)
Abstract Kim's argument appears to render causally efficacious emergence impossible: Hume's argument appears to render normative emergence impossible, and, in its general form, it precludes any emergence at all. I argue that both of these barriers can be overcome, and, in fact, that they each constitute reductions of their respective underlying presuppositions. In particular, causally efficacious ontological emergence can be modeled, but only within a process metaphysics, thus avoiding Kim's argument, and making use of non-abbreviatory forms of definition, thus avoiding Hume's argument. I illustrate these points with models of the emergent nature of normative function and of representation.
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