David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 8 (2):189-205 (1993)
Eliminativism assumes that commonsense psychology describes and explains the mind in terms of the internal design and operation of the mind. If this assumption is invalidated, so is eliminativism. The same conditional is true of intentional realism. Elsewhere (Bogdan 1991) I have argued against this 'folk- theory-theory' assumption by showing that commonsense psychology is not an empirical prototheory of the mind but a biosocially motivated practice of coding, utilizing, and sharing information from and about conspecifics. Here, without presupposing a specific analysis of commonsense psychology, I want to challenge a key implication of the 'folk-theory-theory' assumption to the effect that commonsense psychology is committed to a definite architecture of the mind
|Keywords||Cognition Eliminativism Folk Psychology Metaphysics Proposition|
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Joel Pust (1995). Two Kinds of Representational Functionalism: Defusing the Combinatorial Explosion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):392.
Radu J. Bogdan (1995). The Epistemological Illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):390.
Alison Gopnik (1995). How to Understand Beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):398.
Werner Greve & Axel Buchner (1995). Speaking of Beliefs: Reporting or Constituting Mental Entities? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):391.
Alvin I. Goldman (1995). Epistemology, Two Types of Functionalism, and First-Person Authority. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):395.
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