A Means-End Account of Explainable Artificial Intelligence

Synthese 202 (33):1-23 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) seeks to produce explanations for those machine learning methods which are deemed opaque. However, there is considerable disagreement about what this means and how to achieve it. Authors disagree on what should be explained (topic), to whom something should be explained (stakeholder), how something should be explained (instrument), and why something should be explained (goal). In this paper, I employ insights from means-end epistemology to structure the field. According to means-end epistemology, different means ought to be rationally adopted to achieve different epistemic ends. Applied to XAI, different topics, stakeholders, and goals thus require different instruments. I call this the means-end account of XAI. The means-end account has a descriptive and a normative component: on the one hand, I show how the specific means-end relations give rise to a taxonomy of existing contributions to the field of XAI; on the other hand, I argue that the suitability of XAI methods can be assessed by analyzing whether they are prescribed by a given topic, stakeholder, and goal.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Explainability, Public Reason, and Medical Artificial Intelligence.Michael Da Silva - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (5):743-762.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.
Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.
What is Interpretability?Adrian Erasmus, Tyler D. P. Brunet & Eyal Fisher - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34:833–862.
Epistemic Rationality.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):608-630.
The special status of instrumental reasons.Stephanie Beardman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-17

Downloads
74 (#223,112)

6 months
50 (#87,861)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

SIDEs: Separating Idealization from Deceptive ‘Explanations’ in xAI.Emily Sullivan - forthcoming - Proceedings of the 2024 Acm Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency.

Add more citations