David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-27 (2011)
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Vikki A. Entwistle & Ian S. Watt (2013). Treating Patients as Persons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centered Care. American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):29-39.
Stijn Bruers (2015). In Defense of Eating Vegan. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 28 (4):705-717.
Stijn Bruers (2013). Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic. Philosophia 41 (2):489-501.
Stijn Bruers (2015). The Core Argument for Veganism. Philosophia 43 (2):271-290.
Sem de Maagt & Ingrid Robeyns (2013). Can Person-Centered Care Deal with Atypical Persons? American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):44-46.
Similar books and articles
Tom L. Beauchamp (1999). The Failure of Theories of Personhood. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
Robert Lane (2009). Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):pp. 1-26.
James G. Anderson (1980). Kant's Paralogism of Personhood. Grazer Philosophische Studien 10:73-86.
Carol A. Tauer (1985). Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10 (3):253-266.
Elisa Aaltola (2008). Personhood and Animals. Environmental Ethics 30 (2):175-193.
John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
Laurance Splitter (2011). Identity, Citizenship and Moral Education. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (5):484-505.
Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein (2007). Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48.
Heikki Ikaheimo (2007). Recognizing Persons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):224-247.
John F. Crosby (1993). The Personhood of the Human Embryo. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4):399-417.
Dan Ernst (2008). Neuroscience and Personhood. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 25:21-28.
Arto Laitinen (2007). Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2007 (5-6):248-270.
Gavin J. Fairbairn (2002). Brain Transplants and the Orthodox View of Personhood. In R.N. Fisher (ed.), Suffering, Death, and Identity. New York: Rodopi
Richard Cross (2011). Disability, Impairment, and Some Medieval Accounts of the Incarnation: Suggestions for a Theology of Personhood. Modern Theology 27 (4):639 - 658.
Added to index2011-03-02
Total downloads131 ( #28,313 of 1,796,159 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #74,929 of 1,796,159 )
How can I increase my downloads?