David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-27 (2011)
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. This pre-identification is typically based on biological features. Except in some interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human animals that we identify as persons
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Citations of this work BETA
Stijn Bruers (2013). Speciesism as a Moral Heuristic. Philosophia 41 (2):489-501.
Sem de Maagt & Ingrid Robeyns (2013). Can Person-Centered Care Deal with Atypical Persons? American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):44-46.
Vikki A. Entwistle & Ian S. Watt (2013). Treating Patients as Persons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centered Care. American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):29-39.
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