Propositional Names

Philosophia 39 (1):163-177 (2011)
Abstract
I propose that an adequate name for a proposition will be (1) rigid, in Kripke’s sense of referring to the same thing in every world in which it exists, and (2) transparent, which means that it would be possible, if one knows the name, to know which object the name refers. I then argue that the Standard Way of naming propositions—prefixing the word ‘that’ to a declarative sentence—does not allow for transparent names of every proposition, and that no alternative naming convention does better. I explore the implications of this failure for deflationism about truth, arguing that any theory that requires the T biconditional to be a priori cannot succeed
Keywords Propositions  Names  Deflationism
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Horwich (2001). A Defense of Minimalism. Synthese 126 (1-2):149 - 165.
David Kaplan (1990). Words. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:93 - 119.

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