Situated minimalism versus free enrichment

Synthese 184 (2):179-198 (2012)
In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing
Keywords Situationalism  Contextualism  Minimalism  Free enrichment  Pragmatic intrusion  Context-dependence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9731-5
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John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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