Reply to Peter Bieri's Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous

In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter (1993)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Causation  Concept  Interpretation  Language  Bieri, P
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2006). On the Epistemology of Language. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):677-696.
Claudine Verheggen (2006). How Social Must Language Be? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Paul Snowdon (2011). Perceptual Concepts as Non-Causal Concepts. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. OUP Oxford
Peter Bieri (2007). Was bleibt von der analytischen Philosophie? Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3):333-344.
Peter Bieri (1982). Sein und Aussehen von Gegenständen. Sind die Dinge farbig? Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36 (4):531 - 552.
Peter Bieri (1982). Nominalismus und innere Erfahrung. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36 (1):3 - 24.
Peter Bieri (1981). Quine, Strawson und der Skeptiker. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (1):27 - 45.

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index


Total downloads


Recent downloads (6 months)


How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.