Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part I: Humean supervenience
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1–22 (2005)
This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas S. Kuhn (1996/2012). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. The University of Chicago Press.
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):509-528.
Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender (2009). A Better Best System Account of Lawhood. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):1 - 34.
Tyler Hildebrand (2014). Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
Gregory J. Morgan (2010). Laws of Biological Design: A Reply to John Beatty. Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):379-389.
Bradford Skow (2007). Earman and Roberts on Empiricism About Laws. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):158-162.
Similar books and articles
Susan Schneider (2007). What is the Significance of the Intuition That Laws of Nature Govern? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):307 – 324.
Barry Ward (2007). Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):537 – 552.
Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
Barry Ward (2003). Sometimes the World is Not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.
Lydia Jaeger (2002). Humean Supervenience and Best-System Laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):141 – 155.
David Lewis (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103 (412):473-490.
John Earman & John T. Roberts (2005). Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience About Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):253–286.
John T. Roberts (2005). Contact with the Nomic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1-22.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads192 ( #9,647 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #48,707 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?