Combinatorialism and the possibility of nothing

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):269 – 280 (2006)
Abstract
We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for this possibility given some methodological considerations. Consequently, rather than being 'spoils for the victor', as Armstrong maintains, deciding whether there might have been nothing helps to determine which metaphysics of modality is to be preferred.
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References found in this work BETA
David Armstrong (2003). Truthmakers for Modal Truths. In Hallvard Lillehammer Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (ed.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge. 12-24.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2009). Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.
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