David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480 (2003)
Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required if we reject excluded middle, with special emphasis on the conditional. There is also discussion of higher order indeterminacy (in several different senses) and of penumbral connections; and there is a suggested definition of determinateness in terms of the conditional and a discussion of the extent to which the notion of determinateness is objective. And there are suggestions about a unified treatment of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.
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Martin Smith (2010). What Else Justification Could Be. Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.
Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1):139–165.
Hartry Field (2013). Naive Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a Whole Lot Better. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-45.
Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
Nicholas Stang (2012). Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1117-1139.
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