David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (4):415-447 (2012)
Happiness studies have rekindled interest in the measurement of subjective well-being, and often claim to track faithfully ‘what people care about’ in their lives. It is argued in this article that seeking to respect individuals’ preferences in the context of making intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons for social evaluation has important and somewhat surprising implications, which shed light, in particular, on subjective measures and their objective alternatives, such as Sen’s capability approach. Four points are made. First, raw subjective well-being scores are problematic because they involve different calibration norms for different individuals or for the same individuals at different times. Money-metric and similar measures appear more attractive in this perspective. Second, if individuals genuinely care about their relative positions, incorporating such relative aspects in the evaluation of individual situations does not necessarily lead to rewarding the selfish and malevolent. Third, in the context of risk, relying on ex ante preferences may clash with a concern for ex post preferences, which are better informed. Fourth, focusing on opportunities or capabilities may fail to respect preferences
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Marc Fleurbaey (2012). Equal Opportunity, Reward and Respect for Preferences: Reply to Roemer. Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):201-216.
Joseph Raz (2004). The Role of Well‐Being. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):269–294.
H. E. Baber (2010). Worlds, Capabilities and Well-Being. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):377 - 392.
Daniel M. Haybron (2011). Taking the Satisfaction (and the Life) Out of Life Satisfaction. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):249-262.
Efrat Ram-Tiktin (2012). The Right to Health Care as a Right to Basic Human Functional Capabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):337 - 351.
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 5 Adaptive Preferences and Women's Options. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):67-88.
Ines M. Barrio-Cantalejo, Pablo Simón-Lorda, Adoración Molina-Ruiz, Fátima Herrera-Ramos, Encarnación Martínez-Cruz, Rosa Maria Bailon-Gómez, Antonio López-Rico & Patricia Peinado Gorlat (2013). Stability Over Time in the Preferences of Older Persons for Life-Sustaining Treatment. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (1):103-114.
Cesaltina Pacheco Pires (2002). A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs. Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (2007). Social Choice and Individual Capabilities. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):169-192.
Matthew Noah Smith (2013). The Importance of What They Care About. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):297-314.
Bienke M. Janssen, Tine Regenmortel & Tineke A. Abma (2012). Balancing Risk Prevention and Health Promotion: Towards a Harmonizing Approach in Care for Older People in the Community. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis (1):1-21.
R. T. Meulen (2012). How 'Decent' Is a Decent Minimum of Health Care? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 36 (6):612-623.
Thomas S. Huddle (2007). The Limits of Objective Assessment of Medical Practice. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (6):487-496.
Added to index2012-06-19
Total downloads27 ( #61,793 of 1,096,632 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #102,815 of 1,096,632 )
How can I increase my downloads?