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  1.  14
    Political Corruption, Individual Behaviour and the Quality of Institutions.Emanuela Ceva & Maria Paola Ferretti - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):216-231.
    Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with (...)
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  2.  6
    Introduction to Symposium on Contemporary Moral and Political Philosophy.Thomas Christiano - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):117-118.
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  3.  14
    Self-Organizing Moral Systems: Beyond Social Contract Theory.Gerald Gaus - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):119-147.
    This essay examines two different modes of reasoning about justice: an individual mode in which each individual judges what we all ought to do and a social mode in which we seek to reconcile our judgments of justice so that we can share common rules of justice. Social contract theory has traditionally emphasized the second, reconciliation mode, devising a central plan to do so. However, I argue that because we disagree not only in our judgments of justice but also about (...)
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  4.  27
    The Paradox of Methods.Shelly Kagan - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):148-168.
    Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the method and the (...)
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  5.  27
    Standing and the Sources of Liberalism.Niko Kolodny - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):169-191.
    Whatever else liberalism involves, it involves the idea that it is objectionable, and often wrong, for the state, or anyone else, to intervene, in certain ways, in certain choices. This article aims to evaluate different possible sources of support for this core liberal idea. The result is a pluralistic view. It defends, but also stresses the limits of, some familiar elements: that some illiberal interventions impair valuable activities and that some violate rights against certain kinds of invasion. More speculatively, it (...)
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  6.  22
    How It Makes a Moral Difference That One is Worse Off Than One Could Have Been.Michael Otsuka - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2):192-215.
    In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also (...)
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  7.  15
    Paying Minorities to Leave.Mollie Gerver - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):3-22.
    In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it (...)
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  8.  2
    Paying Minorities to Leave.Mollie Gerver - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):3-22.
    In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it (...)
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  9.  3
    Dividing the Indivisible: Apportionment and Philosophical Theories of Fairness.Conrad Heilmann & Stefan Wintein - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):51-74.
    Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three (...)
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  10.  15
    Cohen’s Community: Beyond the Liberal State?Louis-Philippe Hodgson - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):23-50.
    Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of (...)
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  11.  4
    Cohen’s Community: Beyond the Liberal State?Louis-Philippe Hodgson - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):23-50.
    Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of (...)
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  12.  22
    How Moral Disagreement May Ground Principled Moral Compromise.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):75-96.
    In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise. While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring (...)
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  13.  3
    How Moral Disagreement May Ground Principled Moral Compromise.Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):75-96.
    In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise. While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring (...)
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  14.  4
    Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes.Anthony Taylor - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):97-113.
    A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these attitudes are (...)
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  15.  4
    Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes.Anthony Taylor - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):97-113.
    A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these attitudes are (...)
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  16.  11
    Dividing the Indivisible: Apportionment and Philosophical Theories of Fairness.Stefan Wintein & Conrad Heilmann - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):51-74.
    Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three (...)
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