Hypothetico-deductivism, content, and the natural axiomatization of theories

Philosophy of Science 60 (3):477-487 (1993)
In Gemes (1990) I examined certain formal versions of hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) showing that they have the unacceptable consequence that "Abe is a white raven" confirms "All ravens are black"! In Gemes (1992) I developed a new notion of content that could save H-D from this bizarre consequence. In this paper, I argue that more traditional formulations of H-D also need recourse to this new notion of content. I present a new account of the vexing notion of the natural axiomatization of a theory. The notion is used to construct a form of H-D that allows for the type of selective confirmation without which Glymour (1980a,b) claims H-D is hopeless
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DOI 10.1086/289748
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Gerhard Schurz (2014). Bayesian Pseudo-Confirmation, Use-Novelty, and Genuine Confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):87-96.

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