Graduate studies at Western
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):425-427 (2008)
|Abstract||Hanson claims that moral responsibility should be distributed among both the humans and artifacts comprising complex wholes that produce morally relevant outcomes in the world. I argue that this claim is not sufficiently supported. In particular, adopting a consequentialist understanding of morality does not by itself support the view that the existence of a causally necessary object in such a complex whole is sufficient for assigning moral responsibility to that object. Moreover, there are good reasons, both evolutionary and contemporary, for not adopting this stance.|
|Keywords||Moral responsibility Extended agency Distributed cognition|
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