A "physical" need: Physicalism and the via negativa
Analysis 61 (272):302–309 (2001)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
J. L. Dowell (2006). Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
Warren Shrader (2008). On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.
Neal Judisch (2008). Why 'Non-Mental' Won't Work: On Hempel's Dilemma and the Characterization of the 'Physical'. Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.
D. Gene Witmer (2006). How to Be a (Sort of) A Priori Physicalist. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
Agustin Vicente (2011). Current Physics and 'the Physical'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Sara Worley (2006). Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):101-26.
Barbara Montero & David Papineau (2005). A Defense of the Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism. Analysis 65 (287):233-237.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads42 ( #27,042 of 549,087 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,087 )How can I increase my downloads? |

