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  1. Sara Worley (2009). Review of Anthony Dardis, Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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  2. Sara Worley (2006). Physicalism and the Via Negativa. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):101-26.
    Some philosophers have suggested that, instead of attempting to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the physical, we should adopt the ‘via negativa.’ That is, we should take the notion of the mental as fundamental, and define the physical in contrast, as the non-mental. I defend a variant of this approach, based on some information about how children form concepts. I suggest we are hard-wired to form a concept of intentional agency from a very young age, and so there’s some (...)
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  3. Sara Worley (2006). Review of Scott Sehon, Teleological Realism: Mind, Agency, and Explanation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2).
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  4. Sara Worley (2003). Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism. Analysis 63 (1):15-23.
  5. Paul Cortios Ritual, Jane Duran, Two Arguments Against Foundatationalism, David Kaspar, Sara Worley & Tjeerd B. Jongeling (2002). Philip Montague On Punishment 1 John Wright The Explanatory Role of Realism 35 Stephn Kershnar The Structure of Rights Forfeiture in the Context Of Culpable Wrongdoing 57 Paul M. Huges The Logic of Temptation 89. [REVIEW] Philosophia 29.
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  6. Sara Worley (2002). In Defense of Counterfactuals. Philosophia 29 (1-4):311-325.
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  7. Sara Worley (2000). What is Property P, Anyway? Analysis 60 (1):58-62.
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  8. Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
    In this paper, I argue that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires to subjects like zombies or (present day) computers which do not have phenomenal consciousness. In order to ascribe beliefs, we must distinguish between personal and subpersonal content. There may be states in my brain which represent the array of light intensities on my retina, but these states are not beliefs, because they are merely subpersonal. I argue that we cannot distinguish between personal and subpersonal content without reference (...)
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  9. Sara Worley (1997). Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.
    Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by (...)
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  10. Sara Worley (1996). Counterfactuals, Causation, and Overdetermination. Philosophical Papers 25 (3):189-202.
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  11. Sara Worley (1995). Feminism, Objectivity, and Analytic Philosophy. Hypatia 10 (3):138 - 156.
    Evelyn Fox Keller and Susan Bordo are often cited as sources for the claim that the notion of objectivity found in Western science and analytic philosophy is male-biased. I argue that even if their arguments that objectivity is male-biased are successful, the bias they establish is not a sort which should worry any feminist analytic philosophers (or scientists). I also examine their suggestions for reconceiving objectivity and find them inadequately motivated.
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  12. Sara Worley (1993). Mental Causation and Explanatory Exclusion. Erkenntnis 39 (3):333-358.
    Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the (...)
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