David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148 (2007)
It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth is neither an object (like the True) nor a property (like the Bedeutung of the predicate 'is true') but something of a very special kind that belongs to the same logical category as the logical relations (like subsumption). The main argument justifying this interpretation is that Frege's explication of truth does not hold of the True, but only of truth, considered as what is expressed by the form of the assertoric sentence.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.
Mark Textor (2009). A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts. Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
William W. Taschek (2008). Truth, Assertion, and the Horizontal: Frege on "the Essence of Logic". Mind 117 (466):375-401.
Luis Fernandez Moreno (1996). Un Examen de la Argumentación de Frege Contra la Definibilidad de la Verdad (an Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth). Theoria 11 (3):165-176.
M. Textor (2010). Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth. Mind 119 (475):615-655.
Richard Heck & Robert May (forthcoming). Truth in Frege. In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Peter Pagin (2001). Frege on Truth and Judgment. Organon F 8:1-13.
Joan Weiner (2008). How Tarskian is Frege? Mind 117 (466):427-450.
D. Greimann (2000). The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #63,346 of 1,102,718 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #182,643 of 1,102,718 )
How can I increase my downloads?