Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth
Mind 119 (475):615-655 (2010)
| Abstract | According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, and an object, namely a truth-value | |||||||||
| Keywords | Frege Judgement Truth | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesVerena Mayer (2007). Evidence, Judgment and Truth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):175-197.
Richard G. Heck & Robert May (forthcoming). Truth in Frege. In M. Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Ari Maunu (2002). Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions. Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
David Andrew Bell (1979). Frege's Theory of Judgement. Oxford University Press.
Robin Jeshion (2001). Frege's Notions of Self-Evidence. Mind 110 (440):937-976.
Simon Evnine (2003). Frege on Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Manuscrito 26 (2).
Mark Textor (2009). A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts. Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
Dirk Greimann (2007). Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object? Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
D. Greimann (2000). The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege's Scientific Language. Erkenntnis 52 (2):213-238.
Joan Weiner (2008). How Tarskian is Frege? Mind 117 (466):427-450.
Luis Fernandez Moreno (1996). Un Examen de la Argumentación de Frege Contra la Definibilidad de la Verdad (an Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth). Theoria 11 (3):165-176.
Luis Fernandez Moreno (1996). Un examen de la argumentación de Frege contra la definibilidad de la verdad (An Examination of Frege's Argumentation Against the Definability of Truth). Theoria 11 (3):165-176.
Markus Stepanians (2003). Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable. Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
Dirk Greimann (2008). Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner. Mind 117 (466):403-425.
Erich H. Reck (2007). Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):149-173.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-10-06Total downloads58 ( #16,854 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
