Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 42 (4):373-383 (1975)
|Abstract||For the case of statistical theories, the criteria of explanation, prediction, and testability can all be viewed as particular instances of a more general evaluation scheme. Using the ideas of a gain matrix and expected gain from statistical decision theory, these three criteria can be compared in terms of the elements in their associated gain matrices. This analysis leads to (1) further understanding of the interrelationship between the current criteria, (2) the proposal of an ordering for the criteria, and (3) the suggestion of a new criterion|
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