Reidentification and redescription

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):74-74 (1998)
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Abstract

Millikan's account of substance concepts fails to do away with features. Her approach simply moves the suite of relevant features into an encapsulated module. The crux of the problem for scientists studying human infants and nonhuman animals is to determine how individuals reidentify objects and events in the world.

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10.1017/s0140525x9833040x

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