David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press 138–162 (2009)
I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Kate Nolfi (2015). Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why? Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.
Michael Smith (2012). Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies). Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.
Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (2015). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.
Pascal Engel (2013). Is Epistemic Agency Possible? Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.
Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
Similar books and articles
Shaun Gallagher (2011). Strong Interaction and Self-Agency. Humana.Mente 15:55-76.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). On Epistemic Agency. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
Robert Pippin (2010). Hegel's Social Theory of Agency : The 'Inner-Outer' Problem. In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave Macmillan 3-50.
Mark van Vuuren & François Cooren (2010). “My Attitude Made Me Do It”: Considering the Agency of Attitudes. [REVIEW] Human Studies 33 (1):85-101.
Costas Pagondiotis & Spyros Petrounakos (2007). The Sense of Agency and the Naturalization of the Mental. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:139-143.
Edward Hinchman (2009). Receptivity and the Will. Noûs 43 (3):395-427.
Dorothée Legrand (2007). Naturalizing the Acting Self: Subjective Vs. Anonymous Agency. Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):457 – 478.
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads154 ( #24,735 of 1,911,478 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #36,359 of 1,911,478 )
How can I increase my downloads?