Rational choice theory in sociology

Critical Review 9 (4):519-537 (1995)
James Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory with the classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality. He identifies limits to the rational choice model, and suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them. His project does, however, offer an important critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is of value in analyzing relationships between corporate actors and particular persons.
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DOI 10.1080/08913819508443401
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Jon Elster (1986). Ulysses and the Sirens. Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (1):82-95.

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