Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper works within a particular framework for reasoning about actions—sometimes known as the framework of “stit semantics”—originally due to Belnap and Perloff, based ultimately on the theory of indeterminism set out in Prior’s indeterministic tense logic, and developed in full detail by Belnap, Perloff, and Xu . The issues I want to consider arise when certain normative, or decision theoretic, notions are introduced into this framework: here I will focus on the notion of a right action, and so on the formulation of act utilitarianism within this indeterministic setting. The problem is simply that there are two different, and conflicting, ways of defining this notion, both well-motivated, and both carrying intuitive weight.|
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