David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 39 (4):491-499 (1972)
A belief common among philosophers and biologists alike is that Mendelian genetics has been or is in the process of being reduced to molecular genetics, in the sense of formal theory reduction current in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are numerous empirical and conceptual difficulties which stand in the way of establishing a systematic inferential relation between Mendelian and molecular genetics. These difficulties, however, have little to do with the traditional objections which have been raised to reduction
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Marion Vorms (2014). The Birth of Classical Genetics as the Junction of Two Disciplines: Conceptual Change as Representational Change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 48:105-116.
Marion Vorms (2013). Theorizing and Representational Practices in Classical Genetics. Biological Theory 7 (4):311-324.
Sahotra Sarkar (2015). Nagel on reduction11For Discussions, in Some Cases Over Many Decades, Thanks Are Due to Jordi Cat, Alan Love, Ken Schaffner, Abner Shimony, John Stachel, and Bill Wimsatt. Comments by Participants of the Formal Epistemology and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism Workshop and the Audience at a Philosophy Department Seminar at the University of Sydney Were Also Useful. For Comments on Previous Drafts, Thanks Are Due to Justin Garson and Thomas Uebel. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:43-56.
Martin Carrier & Patrick Finzer (2006). Explanatory Loops and the Limits of Genetic Reductionism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):267 – 283.
Yasuo Deguchi (2006). Break Philosophy Through Internally. Topoi 25 (1-2):33-38.
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