David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35 (2011)
If conceptual analysis is possible for finite thinkers, then there must ultimately be a distinction between complex and primitive or irreducible and unanalyzable concepts, by which complex concepts are analyzed as relations among primitive concepts. This investigation considers the advantages of categorizing intentionality as a primitive rather than analyzable concept, in both a historical Brentanian context and in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. Arguments in support of intentionality as a primitive relation are evaluated relative to objections, especially a recent criticism by Jerry A. Fodor. Against this background, the relation between qualia and intentionality in the understanding of consciousness is explored
|Keywords||Brentano, Franz Conceptual analysis Fodor, Jerry A. Intentionality Logic Semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Hector-Neri Castañeda (1975). Thinking and Doing: The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
Citations of this work BETA
Prakash Mondal (2014). Does Computation Reveal Machine Cognition? Biosemiotics 7 (1):97-110.
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