When is a fallacy not a fallacy?

Metaphilosophy 19 (3‐4):307-312 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The informal fallacies can be conceived as enthymemes that are formally valid. But, then, what accounts for our sense of their fallaciousness? I explain this in terms of the notion of a warrant.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
63 (#255,955)

6 months
5 (#632,816)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joel Marks
University of New Haven

Citations of this work

An Informal Logic Bibliography.Hans V. Hansen - 1990 - Informal Logic 12 (3).
The Case of the Missing Premise.Don S. Levi - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references