David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (December):219-54 (1989)
The present essay is about this problem of the intelligibility of incompatibilist freedom. I do not think Kant, Nagel and Strawson are right in thinking that incompatibilist theories cannot be made intelligible to theoretical reason, nor are those many others right who think that incompatibilist accounts of freedom must be essentially mysterious or terminally obscure. I doubt if I can say enough in one short paper to convince anyone of these claims who is not already persuaded. But I hope to persuade some readers that new ways of thinking about the problem are necessary and, more to the point, that new ways of thinking about the problem are possible. As Nagel says, "nothing approaching the truth has yet been said on this subject." Parts V and VI of this paper present one new way of thinking about the problem. Parts II through IV prepare for this way by distinguishing and discussing two kinds of incompatibilist theories.
|Keywords||Determinism Freedom Incompatibilism Metaphysics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Galen Strawson (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Michael Anthony Istvan (2011). Concerning the Resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420.
Alfred Mele (2013). Unconscious Decisions and Free Will. Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):777-789.
Alfred Mele (2014). Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other? Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.
Manuel Pérez Otero (2016). How Indeterminism Could Help Incompatibilism on Free Action. Dialectica 70 (2):169-184.
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