Abstract

There is a tantalizing but incomplete relationship between Kant's conception of God and his developed ethics. The gap contributes to the common interpretation of Kant's moral theory as coldly formalistic, with no room for natural and admirable feelings of sympathy and goodwill. The goal of this dissertation is twofold: first, to close the gap and arrive at a truly informed interpretation of Kant's ethical theory; and second, to contribute to the discussion of the problems Kant must face: free will, the relevance of the principle of sufficient reason, and how we ought to live our lives, given our relationship to the world and to God. Toward these ends I begin with a selective history of Kant's theology and ethics in the pre-critical works, concentrating on such problems as those described above. The problems persist throughout the critical writings, although in various forms: we will see how some early problems are resolved, some recast but still problematic, and some apparently ignored. In the end I reconstruct Kant's complete ethical view: it is more complicated, more demanding, and yet more humane than a reading of only the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft or the Grundlegung would suggest