Scotus' Fromme Philosophie

Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 73 (2):311-334 (2006)
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Abstract

The extent to which philosophy and theology not only belong together, but also can be identified is one of the main problems in mediaeval philosophy. Out of this arises also the conflict of a supposedly free philosophy with the institutionalized theology administered by the Roman Catholic church. Here the thesis is argued that piety must be seen as the true cause of what is incompatible with philosophy – namely piety in the sense of a spiritual method concerning the possibility of cognition. With the help of different positions of Duns Scotus it will be shown that piety, if there is such, posseses no relation to philosophy and that Scotus’ contribution – which was to save the unity of theological and philosophical thought through a rational foundation of the individual intelligible – can be seen as even excluding spiritual piety

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