Abstract

This dissertation builds the general framework for and defends the main themes of a naturalistic coherence theory of epistemic justification. Chapter 1. argues that naturalism provides coherentism with some effective replies to several objections, in particular, the isolation objection and the regress argument. Chapter 2. develops the isolation objection and argues that its target includes theories with many traditional foundationalist elements. Taking this objection to be the criterion of coherentism makes it more attractive to a wide variety of epistemologists. Chapter 3. addresses the regress argument and claims that a leading version of it is implausible and that other versions are compatible with coherentism. ;Unlike traditional coherentism, as seen in the writings of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, which concentrates on belief contents, naturalism emphasizes relations between belief states. A naturalistic approach to epistemology accounts for justification in terms of the conditions for the occurrence of beliefs. Empirical scientific results are relevant to the formulation of these conditions. Chapter 4. argues for the contingency of epistemic principles, in general, which allows for a fully naturalized epistemology. Chapter 5. argues that a theory of epistemic justification should be externalist. All varieties of internalism and those varieties of externalism which require an explanatory or causal requirement between evidence and beliefs are rejected. A slightly expanded version of Keith Lehrer's case of the gypsy lawyer is defended as a plausible case of justified belief in order to suggest that a new type of externalist theory of epistemic justification is needed