A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism

Oxford University Press (1997)
Abstract
Leplin attempts to reinstate the common sense idea that theoretical knowledge is achievable, indeed that its achievement is part of the means to progress in empirical knowledge. He sketches the genesis of the skeptical position, then introduces his argument for Minimalist Scientific Realism -- the requirement that novel predicitons be explained, and the claim that only realism about scientific theories can explain the importance of novel prediction.
Keywords Realism  Science Philosophy
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Call number Q175.32.R42.L46 1997
ISBN(s) 0195113632   9780195113631  
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Michael Devitt (2011). Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):285-293.
Seungbae Park (2009). Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):115 - 124.
Seungbae Park (2011). A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (1):75-84.

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