Oxford University Press (1997)
|Abstract||Leplin attempts to reinstate the common sense idea that theoretical knowledge is achievable, indeed that its achievement is part of the means to progress in empirical knowledge. He sketches the genesis of the skeptical position, then introduces his argument for Minimalist Scientific Realism -- the requirement that novel predicitons be explained, and the claim that only realism about scientific theories can explain the importance of novel prediction.|
|Keywords||Realism Science Philosophy|
|Buy the book||$36.00 used (64% off) $49.65 new (51% off) $95.00 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||Q175.32.R42.L46 1997|
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