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  1. Jarrett Leplin (2013). Explaining Science's Success: Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works By John Wright. Analysis 74 (1):ant112.
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  2. Jarrett Leplin (2011). The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):738 - 740.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 738-740, December 2011.
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  3. Jarrett Leplin (2009). A Theory of Epistemic Justification. Springer.
    This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief.
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  4. Jarrett Leplin (2007). Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific Realism. Philosophia Scientiae 11 (1):71-97.
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  5. Jarrett Leplin (2007). In Defense of Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.
    Objections to reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have looked insuperable. Reliability is a property of the process of belief formation. But the generality problem apparently makes the specification of any such process ambiguous. The externalism of reliability theories clashes with strongly internalist intuitions. The reliability property does not appear closed under truth-preserving inference, whereas closure principles have strong intuitive appeal. And epistemic paradoxes, like the preface and the lottery, seem unavoidable if knowledge or justification depends on the frequency with (...)
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  6. Jarrett Leplin (2007). Reply to Christensen. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):51 - 52.
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  7. Jarrett Leplin (2007). Reply to Professor Cross. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):99 - 101.
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  8. Mikael Karlsson, Andre Kukla, Jarrett Leplin, David Papineau, Stathis Psillos & Howard Sankey (2006). Scientific Realism. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Jarrett Leplin (2000). The Epistemic Status of Auxiliary Hypotheses: A Reply to Douven. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):376-380.
    Pursuant to criticism, this paper revisits the relation between the theses of empirical equivalence and evidential underdetermination. I argue against some antirealist strategies for fixing the empirical commitments of underdetermined theories.
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  10. Jarrett Leplin (1997). A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Leplin attempts to reinstate the common sense idea that theoretical knowledge is achievable, indeed that its achievement is part of the means to progress in empirical knowledge. He sketches the genesis of the skeptical position, then introduces his argument for Minimalist Scientific Realism -- the requirement that novel predicitons be explained, and the claim that only realism about scientific theories can explain the importance of novel prediction.
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  11. Jarrett Leplin (1997). The Underdetermination of Total Theories. Erkenntnis 47 (2):203-215.
    This paper criticizes the attempt to found the epistemological doctrine that all theories are evidentially underdetermined on the thesis that all theories have empirically equivalent rivals. The criticisms focus on the role of auxiliary hypotheses in prediction. It is argued, in particular, that if auxiliaries are underdetermined, then the thesis of empirical equivalence is undecidable. The inference from empirical equivalence to the underdetermination of total theories would seem to survive the criticisms, because total theories do not require auxiliaries to yield (...)
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  12. Jarrett Leplin (1994). Book Review:The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusion Philip Kitcher. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 61 (4):666-.
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  13. Jarrett Leplin & Larry Laudan (1993). Determination Underdeterred: Reply to Kukla. Analysis 53 (1):8 - 16.
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  14. Jarrett Leplin (1992). Book Review:Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science Larry Laudan. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 59 (4):713-.
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  15. Jarrett Leplin (1992). Realism and Methodological Change. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:435 - 445.
    Some recent theories in theoretical physics are not subject to epistemic evaluation by empiricist standards of evidential warrant. The advantage of these theories is not pragmatic but explanationist; they fail to yield testable consequences that distinguish them from earlier theories. But this is essentially a technological limitation, rather than a theoretical defect. There is an explanation, itself confirmed by empiricist standards, of the unconfirmability of these theories. This paper considers what epistemic stance is proper in this situation, and explores the (...)
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  16. Larry Laudan & Jarrett Leplin (1991). Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination. Journal of Philosophy 88 (9):449-472.
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  17. Jarrett Leplin (1990). Renormalizing Epistemology. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):20-33.
    The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.
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  18. Jarrett Leplin (1988). Is Essentialism Unscientific? Philosophy of Science 55 (4):493-510.
    This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is fixed. The resources of the Causal Theory of Reference and of the traditional cluster or (...)
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  19. Jarrett Leplin (1987). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):575-577.
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  20. Jarrett Leplin (1987). Surrealism. Mind 96 (384):519-524.
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  21. Jarrett Leplin (1987). The Bearing of Discovery on Justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):805 - 814.
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  22. Jarrett Leplin (1987). The Role of Experiment in Theory Construction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (1):72 – 83.
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  23. Larry Laudan, Arthur Donovan, Rachel Laudan, Peter Barker, Harold Brown, Jarrett Leplin, Paul Thagard & Steve Wykstra (1986). Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research. Synthese 69 (2):141 - 223.
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  24. Jarrett Leplin (1986). Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality. Philosophy of Science 53 (1):31-51.
    In response to recent recognition of the complexities of scientific change, discussion of the objectivity and the rationality of science has focused on criteria of theory choice. This paper addresses instead the rationality of scientific decisions at the level of ongoing research. It argues that whether or not a realist view of theories is compatible with the historical discontinuities of scientific change, certain realist assumptions are crucial to the rationality of research. The researcher must presume that questions about the existence (...)
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  25. Jarrett Leplin (1985). Book Review:Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science Ian Hacking. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 52 (2):314-.
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  26. Jarrett Leplin (1985). Book Review:Is Science Progressive? Ilkka Niiniluoto. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 52 (4):646-.
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  27. Jarrett Leplin (1982). The Assessment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):235-249.
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  28. Jarrett Leplin (1982). The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:88 - 97.
    A realist interpretation of successful science is defended against a historical induction to the ultimate failure of current science from the failure of theories which once excelled by current standards. The defense requires (1) restrictions on the forms of success which realism, by its own lights, must explain, (2) referential stability through theory changes where the rejected theory achieves such success, and (3) degrees of truth for scientific statements.
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  29. Jarrett Leplin (1981). Truth and Scientific Progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (4):269-291.
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  30. Jarrett Leplin (1979). Reference and Scientific Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (4):265-284.
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  31. Jarrett Leplin (1979). Theoretical Identification and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophia 8 (October):673-88.
  32. Jarrett Leplin (1976). Synchronisation Rules and Transitivity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):399-402.
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  33. Jarrett Leplin (1975). The Concept of an Ad Hoc Hypothesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 5 (4):309-345.
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  34. Jarrett Leplin (1972). Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology. Philosophy of Science 39 (4):476-490.
    Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxiliary assumptions are necessary for the derivation of evidential propositions from hypotheses is examined. (...)
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  35. Jarrett Leplin (1969). Meaning Variance and the Comparability of Theories. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):69-75.