Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):400-411 (1987)
|Abstract||In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be reduced to physical or functional states, Then the dispositional account of secondary qualities cannot hope to match the explanatory adequacy of a sophisticated reductionist view|
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Physicalism Secondary Quality Subjectivity|
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