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  1. Janet Levin (2013). Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism. Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.
    In traditional armchair methodology, philosophers attempt to challenge a thesis of the form ‘F iff G’ or ‘F only if G’ by describing a scenario that elicits the intuition that what has been described is an F that isn’t G. If they succeed, then the judgment that there is, or could be, an F that is not G counts as good prima facie evidence against the target thesis. Moreover, if these intuitions remain compelling after further (good faith) reflection, then traditional (...)
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  2. Janet Levin (2012). Tye's Ptolemaic Revolution (Review of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts). Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):98-117.
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  3. Janet Levin (2011). Imaginability, Possibility, and the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):391-421.
    It is standard practice in philosophical inquiry to test a general thesis (of the form 'F iff G' or 'F only if G') by attempting to construct a counterexample to it. If we can imagine or conceive of1an F that isn't a G, then we have evidence that there could be an F that isn't a G — and thus evidence against the thesis in question; if not, then the thesis is (at least temporarily) secure. Or so it is standardly (...)
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  4. Janet Levin (2011). Reconstruing Modal Intuitions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):97-112.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that clearly conceived (or imagined) scenarios that seem to be counterexamples to a posteriori identity theses can indeed count as evidence against them—but only if, after reflection on our understanding of their constituent terms and the relevant empirical facts, we find that they cannot be acceptably reconstrued as intuitions about something else. This makes trouble for phenomenalphysical identity statements such as ‘pain is C-fiber stimulation’, since most agree that such statements cannot be so reconstrued—and (...)
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  5. Janet Levin (2009). Experimental Philosophy. Analysis 69 (4):761-769.
    Levin argues that the results of the most methodologically sound and philosophically relevant studies discussed in this volume [Experimental Philosophy] could have been obtained from the armchair, and thus that experimental philosophy may not present a serious challenge to the traditional methods of analytic philosophy.
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  6. Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments (...)
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  7. Janet Levin, Functionalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only (...)
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  8. Janet Levin (2008). Molyneux Meets Euthyphro. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):289-297.
    Many contemporary philosophers contend that a positive answer to Molyneux’s Question -- the question of whether a “man born blind and made to see” would be able to identify spatial figures, without touching them, on first viewing -- requires that there be a *rational connection* between the representations of those figures afforded by vision and by touch. This paper explores the question of what this could mean if the representations are non-discursive, or “pure recognitional” concepts, and argues that the most (...)
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  9. Janet Levin (2008). Molyneux's Question and the Individuation of Perceptual Concepts. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.
    Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of (...)
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  10. Janet Levin (2008). Taking Type-B Materialism Seriously. Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.
    Abstract: Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that (...)
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  11. Janet Levin (2007). Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims? Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
    In Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that intuitions about what is possible play a limited, but important, role in challenging philosophical theses, counting as evidence against them only if they cannot be reconstrued as intuitions about something else, compatible with the thesis in question. But he doesn't provide clear guidelines for determining when such intuitions have been successfully reconstrued, leading some to question their status as evidence for modal claims. In this paper I focus on some worries, articulated by Michael (...)
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  12. Janet Levin (2007). Nagel Vs. Nagel on the Nature of Phenomenal Concepts. Ratio 20 (3):293–307.
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  13. Janet Levin (2007). Review of Karsten R. Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7).
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  14. Janet Levin (2006). What is a Phenomenal Concept? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Janet Levin (2004). The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the (...)
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  16. Janet Levin (2003). Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  17. Janet Levin (2002). Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591.
  18. Janet Levin (2001). The Myth of Jones and the Return of Subjectivity. Mind and Language 16 (2):173-192.
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  19. Janet Levin (2000). Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense. Philosophical Studies 100 (2):151-174.
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  20. Janet Levin (1998). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Philosophical Review 107 (4):644-647.
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  21. Janet Levin (1997). Consciousness Disputed (Review of Chalmers, Dretske, and Tye). [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91-107.
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  22. Janet Levin (1997). Review Article: Consciousness Disputed. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91-107.
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  23. Janet Levin (1997). Review: Consciousness Disputed. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91 - 107.
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  24. Janet Levin (1995). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 104 (415):624-628.
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  25. Janet Levin (1995). Folk Psychology and the Simulationist Challenge. Acta Analytica 10 (14):77-100.
     
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  26. Janet Levin (1991). Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38.
  27. Janet Levin (1988). Must Reasons Be Rational? Philosophy of Science 55 (2):199-217.
    This paper challenges some leading views about the conditions under which the ascription of beliefs and desires can make sense of, or provide reasons for, a creature's behavior. I argue that it is unnecessary for behavior to proceed from beliefs and desires according to the principles of logic and decision theory, or even from principles that generally get things right. I also deny that it is necessary for behavior to proceed from principles that, though perhaps subrational, are similar to those (...)
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  28. Janet Levin (1987). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):400-411.
    In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be reduced to physical or functional (...)
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  29. Janet Levin (1987). Skepticism, Objectivity, and the Invulnerability of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):63-78.
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  30. Janet Levin (1986). Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.
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  31. Janet Levin (1985). Functionalism and the Argument From Conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:85-104.
     
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  32. Janet Levin (1985). Locke. Teaching Philosophy 8 (3):240-242.