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Siblings:See also:History/traditions: Primary and Secondary Qualities
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  1. Keith Allen (2008). Mechanism, Resemblance and Secondary Qualities: From Descartes to Locke. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):273 – 291.
    Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is compared with Descartes’s argument (in the Principles of Philosophy) for the distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible qualities. I argue that following Descartes, Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is an essentially a priori argument, based on our conception of substance, and the constraints on intelligible bodily interaction that this conception of substance sets.
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  2. Fabrizio Amerini (2011). Intention, Primary and Secondary. In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer 555--558.
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  3. Abram Amsel (1950). The Combination of a Primary Appetitional Need with Primary and Secondary Emotionally Derived Needs. Journal of Experimental Psychology 40 (1):1.
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  4. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell
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  5. Margaret Atherton (1992). Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies: Some Distinctive Features of Locke's Account of Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company
  6. Nancy Carol Atkinson (1984). Sentience and Stuff. Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
    This dissertation is a study of the dualistic implications of a doctrine which is as old as the corpuscular hypothesis of early seventeenth century science and as current as particle physics: the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities . PSQD states that some of the most familiar qualities of the macroscopic world, namely color, brightness, sound, odor, flavor, heat and cold, must not be regarded as intrinsic properties of material things but instead as sensations in the minds of percipient organisms. (...)
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  7. Edward W. Averill (1982). The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Review 91 (July):343-362.
  8. Clare Batty (2009). What's That Smell? Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  9. Lewis White Beck (1946). Secondary Quality. Journal of Philosophy 43 (October):599-609.
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  10. Jonathan Bennett (1965). Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):1-17.
  11. Ronald Bentley (1997). Secondary Metabolites Play Primary Roles in Human Affairs. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 40 (2):197-221.
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  12. José María Garrido Bermúdez (2010). Grossmann and Millán-Puelles on the Argument From Physics. Metaphysica 11 (2):163-180.
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  13. Simon W. Blackburn (1993). Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals. Philosophical Perspectives 7:259-279.
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  14. Steffen Borge (2007). Some Remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84.
    John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of (...)’s primary/ secondary quality distinction is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research. (shrink)
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  15. Gordon G. Brittan Jr (1969). Measurability, Commonsensibility, and Primary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):15 – 24.
  16. D. H. M. Brooks (1992). Secondary Qualities and Representation. Analysis 52 (3):174-179.
    Secondary qualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictional qualities. Secondary qualities are a subset of these.
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  17. Alex Byme & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
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  18. Alex Byrne (2011). Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
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  19. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press
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  20. Maurice Charlesworth (1987). Hacker on Secondary Qualities. Mind 76 (July):386-391.
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  21. Richard Chechile & Harry Fowler (1973). Primary and Secondary Negative Incentive Contrast in Differential Conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 97 (2):189.
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  22. Jennifer Church (1985). The Subjective View. Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts. Grazer Philosophische Studien 24:175-184.
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  23. P. R. Cole (1930). Some Aspects of Primary and Secondary Education. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 8:152.
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  24. Phillip D. Cummins (1963). Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (December):202-214.
  25. Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
    This paper presents a new response to the colour similarity argument, an argument that many people take to pose the greatest threat to colour physicalism. The colour similarity argument assumes that if colour physicalism is true, then colour similarities should be scrutable under standard physical descriptions of surface reflectance properties such as their spectral reflectance curves. Given this assumption, our evident failure to find such similarities at the reducing level seemingly proves fatal to colour physicalism. I argue that (...)
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  26. Georges Dicker (1977). Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Proposed Modification of the Lockean Account. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):457-471.
  27. Karann Beth Durland (1996). Primary and Secondary Qualities: Common Sense, Science, and Berkeley. Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    The conviction that some of the properties we attribute to objects are objective and mind-independent, and that others belong only to the mind, commonly finds expression in some version or other of the primary/secondary quality distinction. Both the conviction and the distinction used to express it receive support from ordinary sensory experience and from explanatory considerations of modern science. Yet a largely unappreciated and frequently misunderstood argument of Berkeley's shows, I maintain, that the conviction, at least as expressed in a (...)
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  28. Jim Edwards (1992). Secondary Qualities and the a Priori. Mind 101 (402):263-272.
  29. Andy Egan (2006). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they (...)
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  30. William K. Estes (1949). A Study of Motivating Conditions Necessary for Secondary Reinforcement. Journal of Experimental Psychology 39 (3):306.
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  31. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  32. Eugen Fischer (2009). Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities. Synthese 171 (1):77 - 110.
    The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...)
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  33. Marina Folescu (2015). Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight. History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1):19-36.
    In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with (...)
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  34. Paul W. Foos, Mark A. Sabol, Gustav Corral & Luana Mobley (1987). Age Differences in Primary and Secondary Memory. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (3):159-160.
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  35. Elisa Freschi (2008). How Do Exhortative Expressions Work? Bhāvanā and Vidhi in Rāmānujācārya and Other Mīmād Msā Authors. Rivista di Studi Orientali 81:149-185.
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  36. Fanchon Frohlich (1959). Primary Qualities in Physical Explanation. Mind 68 (April):209-217.
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  37. Todd Stuart Ganson (1998). On the Origins of Philosophical Inquiry Concerning the Secondary Qualities. Dissertation, Cornell University
    It is natural to suppose that honey tastes the way it does because it is sweet. Democritus, Plato and Aristotle all agree that this explanation is superficial and lacks causal depth; they attempt to explain gustatory phenomena by invoking explanatorily fundamental features of the world. As they work out their causal stories, do they give up on the common-sense explanation of why honey tastes the way it does? In other words, do they deny that sweetness and other sensible qualities are (...)
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  38. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (2007). A Non-Modal Conception of Secondary Properties. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):1-33.
    There seems to be a distinction between primary and secondary properties; some philosophers defend the view that properties like colours and values are secondary, while others criticize it. The distinction is usually introduced in terms of essence; roughly, secondary properties essentially involve mental states, while primary properties do not. In part because this does not seem very illuminating, philosophers have produced different reductive analyses in modal terms, metaphysic or epistemic. Here I will argue, firstly, that some well-known examples fail, and (...)
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  39. Andrea Pace Giannotta (2015). Sensazioni o proprietà sensibili? Lo statuto ontologico dei qualia in fenomenologia. In Roberta Lanfredini (ed.), Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia. Mimesis 157-187.
    In this work I address the issue of the ontological status of qualitative properties. First of all, I analyse the prevalent approach to the problem of qualia in philosophy of mind, within the project of naturalization of the mind. I highlight, in particular, that this project is based on a specific conception of material nature (mathematic-quantitative naturalism). Then, I thematize the epistemological presuppositions of this view, discussing them in relation to the so-called problem of perception. I do so taking into (...)
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  40. James J. Gibson (1969). Are There Sensory Qualities of Objects? Synthese 19 (April):408-409.
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  41. R. P. Gregory (1984). Streaming, Setting and Mixed Ability Grouping in Primary and Secondary Schools: Some Research Findings. Educational Studies 10 (3):209-226.
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  42. Edward C. Halper (1993). Primary Ousia. Review of Metaphysics 46 (3):625-627.
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  43. Errol E. Harris (1956). The Mind-Dependence of Objects. Philosophical Quarterly 6 (24):223-235.
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  44. Gary Hatfield (2011). Kant and Helmholtz on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press 304-338.
    This chapter finds two versions of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Locke. Although agreeing that primary qualities are physically basic properties of extended particles (including size, shape, position, and motion), these authors differed on whether secondary qualities such as color exist only in the mind as sensations or belong to bodies as powers to cause sensations. Kant was initially a metaphysical realist about primary qualities as spatialized forces (vs. bare extended particles), before placing (...)
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  45. Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
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  46. Charles Owen Hopkins (1955). Effectiveness of Secondary Reinforcing Stimuli as a Function of the Quantity and Quality of Food Reinforcement. Journal of Experimental Psychology 50 (5):339.
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  47. A. E. J. (1966). Primary Philosophy. Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):378-378.
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  48. Rockney Jacobsen (1986). Colin McGinn, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Individual Thoughts Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 6 (1):9-11.
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  49. Michael Jacovides, Locke's Image of the World.
    According to Locke there are interesting analogies between deductive inferences and inferences concerning seventeenth century machines. Where he believes that phenomena can’t be explained mechanically, as with gravity, he attributes the phenomena to the arbitrary activity of the God. Locke emphasizes difficulties at the foundations of corpuscularianism, concluding that our idea of corporeal substance is obscure because we can’t use it to explain cohesion or impulse. On these foundations, he offers us an explanatory account of inherence, an account which would (...)
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  50. Michael Jacovides (2011). Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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