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Siblings:See also:History/traditions: Primary and Secondary Qualities
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  1. Keith Allen (2008). Mechanism, Resemblance and Secondary Qualities: From Descartes to Locke. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (2):273 – 291.
    Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is compared with Descartes’s argument (in the Principles of Philosophy) for the distinction between mechanical modifications and sensible qualities. I argue that following Descartes, Locke’s argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is an essentially a priori argument, based on our conception of substance, and the constraints on intelligible bodily interaction that this conception of substance sets.
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  2. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.
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  3. Margaret Atherton (1992). Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies: Some Distinctive Features of Locke's Account of Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company.
  4. Edward W. Averill (1982). The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Review 91 (July):343-362.
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  5. Clare Batty (2009). What's That Smell? Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  6. Lewis White Beck (1946). Secondary Quality. Journal of Philosophy 43 (October):599-609.
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  7. Jonathan Bennett (1965). Substance, Reality, and Primary Qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (January):1-17.
  8. Simon W. Blackburn (1993). Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals. Philosophical Perspectives 7:259-279.
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  9. Steffen Borge (2007). Some Remarks on Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities. Acta Analytica 22 (1):74-84.
    John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ (...)
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  10. Gordon G. Brittan Jr (1969). Measurability, Commonsensibility, and Primary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):15 – 24.
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  11. D. H. M. Brooks (1992). Secondary Qualities and Representation. Analysis 52 (3):174-179.
    Secondary qualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictional qualities. Secondary qualities are a subset of these.
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  12. Alex Byrne (2011). Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  13. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Maurice Charlesworth (1987). Hacker on Secondary Qualities. Mind 76 (July):386-391.
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  15. Phillip D. Cummins (1963). Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (December):202-214.
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  16. Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
    This paper presents a new response to the colour similarity argument, an argument that many people take to pose the greatest threat to colour physicalism. The colour similarity argument assumes that if colour physicalism is true, then colour similarities should be scrutable under standard physical descriptions of surface reflectance properties such as their spectral reflectance curves. Given this assumption, our evident failure to find such similarities at the reducing level seemingly proves fatal to colour physicalism. I argue that we should (...)
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  17. Georges Dicker (1977). Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Proposed Modification of the Lockean Account. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):457-471.
  18. Jim Edwards (1992). Secondary Qualities and the a Priori. Mind 101 (402):263-272.
  19. Andy Egan (2006). Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):97-119.
    Colors aren't as real as shapes. Shapes are full?fledged qualities of things in themselves, independent of how they're perceived and by whom. Colors aren't. Colors are merely qualities of things as they are for us, and the colors of things depend on who is perceiving them. When we take the fully objective view of the world, things keep their shapes, but the colors fall away, revealed as the mere artifacts of our own subjective, parochial perspective on the world that they (...)
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  20. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  21. Eugen Fischer (2009). Philosophical Pictures and Secondary Qualities. Synthese 171 (1):77 - 110.
    The paper presents a novel account of nature and genesis of some philosophical problems, which vindicates a new approach to an arguably central and extensive class of such problems: The paper develops the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘philosophical pictures’ with the help of some notions adapted from metaphor research in cognitive linguistics and from work on unintentional analogical reasoning in cognitive psychology. The paper shows that adherence to such pictures systematically leads to the formulation of unwarranted claims, ill-motivated problems, and pointless (...)
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  22. Marina Folescu (forthcoming). Perceiving Bodies Immediately: Thomas Reid's Insight. History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (1).
    In An Inquiry into the Human Mind and in Essays on Intellectual Powers, Thomas Reid discusses what kinds of things perceivers are related to in perception. Are these things qualities of bodies, the bodies themselves, or both? This question places him in a long tradition of philosophers concerned with understanding how human perception works in connecting us with the external world. It is still an open question in the philosophy of perception whether the human perceptual system is providing us with (...)
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  23. Fanchon Frohlich (1959). Primary Qualities in Physical Explanation. Mind 68 (April):209-217.
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  24. James J. Gibson (1969). Are There Sensory Qualities of Objects? Synthese 19 (April):408-409.
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  25. Gary Hatfield (2011). Kant and Helmholtz on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
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  26. Emmett Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229--56.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"- the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated.
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  27. Michael Jacovides, The Scientific Revolution and Locke's Image of the World.
    The book is an examination of the influence of the scientific revolution on Locke’s metaphysics and epistemology. It pursues two ambitions. First, that by understanding the scientific background to Locke’s thoughts, we can solve persistent and vexing problems of interpretation. Second, that by looking at the mechanisms by which scientific doctrines affect philosophical beliefs, we can learn something about the character of philosophical principles.
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  28. Michael Jacovides (2007). Locke's Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Cambridge University Press.
    in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay, edited by Lex Newman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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  29. Michael Jacovides (1999). Locke's Resemblance Theses. Philosophical Review 108 (4):461-496.
    Locke asserts that “the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; But the Ideas, produced in us by these Secondary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all.”1 On an unsophisticated way of taking his words, he means that ideas of primary qualities are like the qualities they represent and ideas of secondary qualities are unlike the qualities they represent.2 I will show that if we take his (...)
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  30. P. J. E. Kail (2001). Hutcheson's Moral Sense: Skepticism, Realism, and Secondary Qualities. History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (1):57 - 77.
  31. Laura Keating (1993). Un-Locke-Ing Boyle: Boyle on Primary and Secondary Qualities. History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (4):305 - 323.
  32. William C. Kneale (1951). Sensation and the Physical World. Philosophical Quarterly 1 (January):109-126.
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  33. John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. Among the (...)
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  34. Janet Levin (1987). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of Secondary Qualities. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (December):400-411.
    In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be reduced to physical or functional (...)
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  35. Douglas Lewis (1970). Some Problems of Perceptions. Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113.
    Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of 'dependent' which (...)
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  36. Dan López de Sa (2006). Values Vs Secondary Qualities. Teorema 25:197-210.
    McDowell, responding to Mackie’s argument from queerness, defended realism about values by analogy to secondary qualities. A certain tension between two interpretations of McDowell’s response is highlighted. According to one, realism about values would indeed be vindicated, but at the cost of failing to provide an appropriate response to Mackie’s argument; whereas according to the other, McDowell does provide an adequate response, but evaluative realism is jeopardized.
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  37. Arthur O. Lovejoy (1913). Secondary Qualities and Subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (8):214-218.
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  38. Mohan Matthen (2010). Color Experience: A Semantic Theory. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. 67--90.
    What is the relationship between color experience and color? Here, I defend the view that it is semantic: color experience denotes color in a code innately known by the perceiver. This semantic theory contrasts with a variety of theories according to which color is defined as the cause of color experience (in a special set of circumstances). It also contrasts with primary quality theories of color, which treat color as a physical quantity. I argue that the semantic theory better accounts (...)
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  39. Nicholas Maxwell (2000). The Mind-Body Problem and Explanatory Dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.
    An important part of the mind-brain problem arises because sentience and consciousness seem inherently resistant to scientific explanation and understanding. The solution to this dilemma is to recognize, first, that scientific explanation can only render comprehensible a selected aspect of what there is, and second, that there is a mode of explanation and understanding, the personalistic, quite different from, but just as viable as, scientific explanation. In order to understand the mental aspect of brain processes - that aspect we know (...)
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  40. Colin McGinn (1983). The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities And Indexical Thoughts. Clarendon Press.
    This book investigates the subjective and objective representations of the world, developing analogies between secondary qualities and indexical thoughts and arguing that subjective representations are ineliminable. Throughout, McGinn brings together historical and contemporary discussions to illuminate old problems in a novel way.
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  41. Jennifer McKitrick (2002). Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):478-494.
    Reid offers an under-appreciated account of the primary/secondary quality distinction. He gives sound reasons for rejecting the views of Locke, Boyle, Galileo and others, and presents a better alternative, according to which the distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Primary qualities, for Reid, are qualities whose intrinsic natures can be known through sensation. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are unknown causes of sensations. Some may object that Reid's view is internally inconsistent, or unacceptably relativistic. However, a deeper understanding shows (...)
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  42. David McNaughton (1984). McGinn on Experience of Primary and Secondary Qualities. Analysis 44 (2):78-80.
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  43. Roderick Millar (1983). Valberg's Secondary Qualities. Philosophy 58 (January):107-109.
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  44. Nenad Miscevic (2001). Painting the Manifest Picture. Acta Analytica 16 (26):75-96.
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  45. Nenad Miscevic (1997). Secondary and Tertiary Qualities: Semantics and Response--Dependence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):363-379.
    Secondary and tertiary qualities are plausibly explained along dispositionalist lines. Concepts of such qualities are response-dependent, denoting properties that are partly mind/brain-dependent. Unfortunately, dispositionalism is hard to square with extant versions of naturalistic theories of representation. In particular the standard naturalistic (indicational) semantics of representational content cannot handle the question from either the subjectivist or the dispositional viewpoint. The paper proposes a remedy: the problem can be solved in a smooth and natural way, provided that we revise and supplement the (...)
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  46. Gabriel Moked (1988). Particles And Ideas: Bishop Berkeley's Corpuscularian Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
    Demonstrating that in George Berkeley's last major work, Siris, Berkeley had converted to a belief in the usefulness of the concept and existence of minute particles, Moked here posits that Berkeley developed a highly original brand of corpuscularian physics.
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  47. Steven M. Nadler (1990). Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):47-61.
  48. Igor Narski (1974). The Question of the Objective Content of Sensations. Ajatus 36:44-74.
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  49. David Novitz (1975). Primary and Secondary Qualities: A Return to Fundamentals. Philosophical Papers 4 (October):89-104.
    The aim of this article is to give an account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in a way which allows the distinction a useful place in an explanation of scientific enquiry. this is done by modifying certain of locke's criteria for primacy, and by showing that this procedure has certain advantages over keith campbell's account of the distinction. in particular, i argue that primary qualities cannot be specified in a theory-neutral way, and that this has important consequences (...)
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  50. Tim O'Keefe (1997). The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities for Democritus and Epicurus. Ancient Philosophy 17 (1):119-134.
    One striking oddity about Democritus and Epicurus is that, even though Epicurus' theory of perception is largely the same as that of Democritus, Democritus and his followers draw skeptical conclusions from this theory of perception, whereas Epicurus declares that all perceptions are true or real. I believe that the dispute between Democritus and Epicurus stems from a question over what sort of ontological status should be assigned to sensible qualities. In this paper, I address three questions: 1) Why were Democritus (...)
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