David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (1):25 – 42 (2000)
Penelope Maddy has defended a modified version of mathematical platonism that involves the perception of some sets. Frederick Suppe has developed a conclusive reasons account of empirical knowledge that, when applied to the sets of interest to Maddy, yields that we have knowledge of these sets. Thus, Benacerraf's challenge to the platonist to account for mathematical knowledge has been met, at least in part. Moreover, it is argued that the modalities involved in Suppe's conclusive reasons account of knowledge can be handled without recourse to either laws of nature or possible worlds, and that this approach is preferable.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Penelope Maddy (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Penelope Maddy (1990). Realism in Mathematics. Oxford University Prress.
Philip Kitcher (1983). The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Nescolarde-Selva & J. L. Usó-Doménech (2014). Reality, Systems and Impure Systems. Foundations of Science 19 (3):289-306.
Similar books and articles
Colin Cheyne (1999). Problems with Profligate Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (2):164-177.
John P. Burgess (1988). Sets and Point-Sets: Five Grades of Set-Theoretic Involvement in Geometry. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:456 - 463.
Douglas Odegard (1976). Conclusive Reasons and Knowledge. Mind 85 (338):239-241.
Emily Carson (1996). On Realism in Set Theory. Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1):3-17.
Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
George S. Pappas & Marshall Swain (1973). Some Conclusive Reasons Against 'Conclusive Reasons'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):72 – 76.
Michael J. Shaffer (2006). Some Recent Appeals to Mathematical Experience. Principia 10 (2):143-170.
Dennis Lomas (2002). What Perception is Doing, and What It is Not Doing, in Mathematical Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):205-223.
Alex Levine (2005). Conjoining Mathematical Empiricism with Mathematical Realism: Maddy's Account of Set Perception Revisited. Synthese 145 (3):425 - 448.
Martin Curd (1983). Some Inconclusive Reasons Against 'Conclusive Reasons'. Philosophy Research Archives 9:293-302.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #179,812 of 1,907,073 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,221 of 1,907,073 )
How can I increase my downloads?