Philo 7 (2):131-137 (2004)
|Abstract||Abstract: My goal in this paper is to provide critical discussion of Michael Rea’s case for three of the controversial theses defended in his World Without Design: (1) that naturalism must be viewed as what he calls a “research program”; (2) that naturalism “cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence,” as he puts it; and (3) that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting realism about material objects|
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