Philosophical psychology in historical perspective: Review essay of J.-c. Smith (ed.), Historical foundations of cognitive science [Book Review]

Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):381 – 390 (1996)
Historiography of science faces a preliminary question of strategy. A continuist conception of the history of science poses research problems different from those of a dynamic conception, which acknowledges that not only our theoretical knowledge but also the explananda themselves may change under the influence of new scientific insights. Whereas continuist historiography may advance our understanding of (the historical background of) current theoretical problems, dynamic historiography may also make a creative contribution to the progress of present-day research. This f act is illustrated in a discussion of the various treatments of paradigmatic episodes in the history of philosophical psychology collected in the book under review, ranging from Socratic and Platonic sources of cognitivism, through medieval and modem views on mental language, representation and consciousness, to such 20th-century contributions as those of Husserl, Titchener, and analytic philosophy.
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DOI 10.1080/09515089608573190
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Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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