Split brains and atomic persons

Philosophy of Science 49 (March):91-106 (1982)
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Abstract

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation

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Citations of this work

The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness.Farid Masrour - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 208-229.
Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder.Timothy J. Bayne - 2002 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
An Alternative to an Alternative to Brain Death.Peter Koch - 2009 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:89-98.

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References found in this work

Brain bisection and personal identity.Roland Puccetti - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.
What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at ‘split-brain’ man.Daniel N. Robinson - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):73-78.
Further discussion of split brains and hemispheric capabilities.Joseph E. Bogen - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (September):281-6.
Consciousness and commissurotomy.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1978 - Philosophy 53 (April):185-99.

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